

DE ANIMA

Disputation I: On the Substance of the Soul in General

Question 1

Whether the soul is act

*in the sense of being a substantial form*¹⁹

1 It was my decision to discuss in these questions each term of the definition of the soul one by one so that [Aristotle's] teaching will be as clear as possible. Therefore at this point by investigating its genus we ask whether it is an act [of the body] and, [if so], in what way it is. There is reason for doubt since Aristotle said that the soul is an act but

¹⁹ The Scholastics distinguished two senses of "act". In one sense, the primary sense, an act is that which is the intrinsic actualization of something's capacity to be a such and such. Thus, if a person learns to speak French, her acquired ability to speak it, is the actualization of her capacity to learn to speak it, and in virtue of that actualization she is "a French speaker". In another, secondary sense, "act" means "action", that is, it means the *process* by which "act" in the first sense is produced. In asking whether the soul is an act Suarez is asking whether it is the intrinsic actualization of the "body's" capacity to be a living being. In question 3 of this Disputation he considers, at length, various ways one might understand what it is to be "the body" of a living organism.

nevertheless he left it undecided, as it were, whether it is an informing act or an improper act, that is one that attends and governs the body.²⁰ And it seems that it is not a substantial form since a substantial form does not suppose that the substance it actualizes is integrally constituted. But the soul does indeed suppose a complete substance. It, in fact, supposes an organic body of which it is the act, as Aristotle says.²¹

Some confirm this as follows: If the soul were informing, it would inform all the parts in the same way; but we see that not all the parts have the same being nor the same mode of substance.²² But these arguments are unsound since the form is that which gives being; the soul, however, is that which gives the being of a living thing. Therefore, [the soul is an informing substantial form].²³

²⁰ A true, or informing, act actualizes the capacity of an appropriately disposed matter to be something either accidentally or substantially. Thus the substantial act (i.e. substantial form) of a tree, by its union with the matter of the tree, actualizes the capacity of that matter to become the "body" of a tree. An assisting or governing act, however, is external to the thing it is the "act" of. Such are the separated substances who move the heavenly bodies according to the astronomical doctrine of the medieval, renaissance, and baroque Schoolmen.

²¹ *De an.*, 412a 19-22. This objection to the soul's being a substantial form is predicated on the idea that a true substantial form informs prime matter and not matter that has *already* been actualized by *another* form. Since a soul can only inhabit a body that has an organic structure, it cannot inform prime matter, and hence cannot be a true form, according to this objection

²² This objection to the soul's being a substantial form seems to be predicated on the idea that a substantial form would uniformly inform its substrate and hence would give the same character to all the parts of its substrate. Based on this, one could infer that a soul is not an informing form since every living being is characterized by parts that are qualitatively different from each other.

²³ This brief argument puts forward Suarez's chief reason for thinking that the soul is a true substantial form. It is that a substantial form "gives substantial being" of a certain sort to a substance and only the soul could give that sort of substantial being characteristic of *living* substances; hence, the soul is a true substantial form.

2 *Whether the soul as such is an informing form.*---In this question we are not asking in particular whether the sensitive soul or the rational soul is the true form [of the living body]²⁴ (we shall discuss this at the proper place²⁵), but we are asking in general what is the nature of the soul. For once [the nature of the soul] is known and it is determined about the nature of the being of the soul that it is a true form informing a body, it will be possible to ask about the rational soul and about others whether they truly inform, and this will be to ask whether they are true souls.²⁶

3 Therefore these questions are not interdependent,²⁷ and so we must move ahead towards the proposed solutions, and we must begin now with Aristotle in Book I, chapter 2²⁸ [of *On the Soul*] with the common notion of the soul.

1. There is in fact no human being who does not distinguish living things from non-living things in virtue of their activities. This difference is clear in animals as St. Thomas observes in [the *Summa theologiae*] I p., q. 18, art. 1. We say, indeed, that an animal is alive when it

²⁴ This is a reference to the view that rational souls, being immaterial and naturally immortal, could not be ordered to informing a body and hence could not be substantial forms of living beings in the strict sense. Such a view, characteristic of many of the Church Fathers and perhaps of St. Augustine, was combated vigorously by St. Thomas and his followers but one could hold that Descartes, in his own way, revived it.

²⁵ In Disputation 2, questions 2 and 4 (not included in the present translation).

²⁶ For Suarez a soul, in the strict sense, gives life to a living material substance by informing matter. Hence, according to him, angels, being pure spirits which are not ordered to informing a matter, are not, strictly speaking, souls.

²⁷ That is, in order to determine whether or not there are any souls in the strict sense (i.e. any substantial forms which give life to living beings by informing matter) one need not first determine whether or not the principle of reason and will in human beings is a soul in the strict sense.

²⁸ *De an.*, 403 b 24 ff.

can have of its own accord motion or some sensation. If it is completely deprived of this power, it is considered dead. Thus the ancients, as Aristotle reports,²⁹ distinguished living things from non-living things by motion and sensation. Plato in the *Phaedo* says this,³⁰ and Aristotle in Book 8 of the *Physics*.³¹ Therefore those things which can move themselves are called living, but those which have no ability to move themselves are called non-living.³² Hence we commonly call waters that are perpetually standing "dead," but those which are constantly flowing we, metaphorically, call "living".

2. People commonly think that material things which are alive are not completely simple, but there is in them something because of which they are alive. Experience, in fact, teaches that an animal that previously lived, sensed, was self-moving, etc., after something departed or some one of its dispositions was removed, can no longer move itself nor sense, although its body remains the same with respect to its whole entity as far as it appears externally. From this it is obviously true that there was something in that body which vivified the animal and, as long as it existed, life was maintained and, when it withdrew, death occurred. That something, whatever it is, all call the soul. From this fact we can conclude with St. Thomas³³ that "life" or "to live" is taken from activity for that is said to have life which can move itself of its own accord. Still, although life is taken from activity, nevertheless, the word has been imposed to signify the substance

²⁹ *Ibid.* 403 b 27 ff.

³⁰ ? Cf. *Tim.* 34 c.

³¹ 254 b 7-17.

³² It might seem that, according to this criterion, plants are not living. But the Schoolmen had a broader notion of what "self motion" involves than we do. For them, a thing could be said to be self moving if it could in some way act upon itself in order to perfect and complete itself. Plants do this by growing and by actively maintaining their organic structure. For a good discussion of the Scholastic notion of living or immanent action, see Des Chene, *Life's Form*, pp. 55-63.

³³ *De an.*, II, lect. 1, n. 219.

of the living thing from which the activity flows. Thus to live is the very substantial being of a living thing as Aristotle says in Book 2, *On the Soul*, text 37.³⁴ Albert in his commentary on this passage, chapter 6,³⁵ says that to live is the act of a soul in that which is animated.

It is true that ["to live"] is sometimes taken to mean act as a living being, as St. Thomas observed above in [his commentary on *On the Soul*] II, lect. 1, n. 219, and in [the *Summa theologiae*] 1.2, q., 3, a. 2, ad 1. Life however is not the soul itself, as many incorrectly say, but the soul is the principle of life. "Life" is the abstract form of "living thing"³⁶ and signifies the whole nature of the living thing as we gather from St. Thomas in [the *Summa theologiae*] 1 p., q. 54, a.1 ad. 2 just as "humanity" does not mean the rational soul but the whole nature of a human being.³⁷ Thus life is distinguished from a living thing as nature is from the supposite.³⁸ And just as God alone is His nature and

³⁴ 413 a 20 ff.

³⁵ *De an.*, Vol. II, 1, 6, in *Alberti Magni opera omnia* (Paris: August Borgnet, 1890-1898), pp. 201-202.

³⁶ The Scholastics typically distinguished between concrete and abstract forms of the same term. Thus "man" is the concrete form of a term signifying something that is human, while "humanity" is the abstract form of it signifying "that by which" a man is human. For some Schoolman (e.g. Scotus) the distinction between these forms mirrored an ontological distinction between individual instances of a nature and a real universal (humanity) that is at least formally distinct from its instances. Suarez, being a nominalist, did not so interpret the distinction. But he did think it pointed, at least in created things, to a distinction between the concrete nature of a thing and the thing itself which is constituted by that nature and by a mode of subsistence. On this see *Metaphysical Disputation XV, On the Formal Cause of Substance*, translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000), Section XI, pp. 178-183.

³⁷ According to Suarez "humanity" signifies that by which a human is a human, and it includes the soul of the human as well as the matter that soul informs.

³⁸ The supposite, according to Suarez, is constituted by a nature, which is that by which a thing is what it is and has the sorts of powers it has, and a mode of subsistence which terminates it and intrinsically actualizes it as a complete

His deity,³⁹ so He alone is His life as even Aristotle understood;⁴⁰ see Book 12 of the *Metaphysics*, text 39.⁴¹ But creatures are not their life according to the theologians, but they live through an act that has been communicated to them.⁴² Thus St. Thomas [teaches this], in the aforementioned passage of [his commentary on *On the Soul*] q. 18; Albert, in [his commentary on the same work], II 1, 6 and Alexander of Hales [in his *Summa theologiae*]⁴³ 2 p., q. 87, memb. 2, a. 1.

Nevertheless, it is customary at times for "life" to be taken as vital activity as when life is distinguished into active and contemplative. Aristotle in Book 10, chapter 4 of the [*Nicomachean*] *Ethics*⁴⁴ defines life through activity and all things, he says, seek life, i.e. activity. Likewise in Book 1, Chapter 3 of the *Politics*⁴⁵ and Chapter 1 of *On Death and Life*.⁴⁶ And this is the usual interpretation.

In whatever way it is taken, however, it is clear from what has been said that in things which are alive there must be some sort of principle

substance which is incommunicable to another. According to this doctrine the human nature of Christ has an existence (*esse*) of its own, but no mode of subsistence of its own-it shares in the subsistence of the second Person of the Trinity.

³⁹ God, according to Suarez, is not constituted of a divine nature and a mode of subsistence in any way really distinct from God. In virtue of His perfection God is simple and so God *is* His nature.

⁴⁰ Unlike creatures God does not live by a principle of life in any way distinct from Himself, but is totally, wholly, and immediately living.

⁴¹ 1072 b 26-31.

⁴² That is, creatures live by means of a nature that is at least modally distinct from them. We might conceive of this as a set of vital powers or, perhaps, as that which "roots" such a set of powers. But this nature is not *that which* is alive, but that *by which* a living being is alive.

⁴³ Cologne, 1622.

⁴⁴ 1175 a 10-19.

⁴⁵ 1254 a 7.

⁴⁶ 467 b 22-25.

of life and that is called "soul." Thus it is clear that the soul exists.⁴⁷ Still we ask what it is.

4 *What is the soul.*---To answer this we must first make mention of the controversy among philosophers about the composition of natural things---whether they consist of atoms, or solely of elements, whether of a subject with accidents, or indeed of matter and substantial form.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ If one means by "soul" what contemporaries do, it might seem that Suarez's assertion here amounts to nothing short of question begging. But, like the ancient Greeks, Suarez defined the soul simply as "that in virtue of which living beings are able to perform vital operations." Since Suarez was a realist, he held that true predicates we apply to things really hold of them *independently* of our taking those predicates to hold of them and, hence, that there is always some real entity "in" a thing in virtue of which a predicate is truly applied to it. Since living beings perform operations of a radically different sort than non-living beings, and since corpses also are unable to perform the sorts of activities characteristic of living beings, Suarez held it is "evident" that there is *something* (even if only a certain relational structure) in virtue of which living beings are alive. But this does not mean he held it is evident that that in virtue of which living beings are alive or in virtue of which humans are able to reason is anything like Descartes' immaterial thinking thing.

⁴⁸ Suarez clearly holds that all souls are substantial forms of some sort; thus he wants to briefly argue here for that conclusion in contradistinction to notions of the soul typical of those who do not hold the hylomorphic theory of Aristotle. Suarez considers here the following theories.

1. *A living being consists of atoms.* On this view the soul would be a relational accident. It would be an instance of a certain way of arranging atoms. One thing Suarez found unacceptable about this view is that it entails that living beings, including humans, are accidental unities, and not true or *per se* unities.
2. *A living being consists of the elements.* On this view the soul would also be some sort of relational accident. The difference between this view and that of the atomists is that upholders of this view did not suppose that the elemental substances (i.e. substances which cannot be divided into parts which differ in nature from the whole they are parts of) are constituted out of atoms. They thus perhaps agreed with Aristotle that bodies are only *potentially* infinitely divisible but

The ancients, therefore, who did not comprehend this ultimate composition, were not able to know that the soul is the true act and substantial form of a living thing and thus they produced innumerable fantasies.

Some, in fact, such as Democritus⁴⁹ and Leucippus⁵⁰ said that the soul is something composed of many circular atoms of a fiery nature, circular so they would be apt for moving and fiery because life consists in warmth. But others, such as Hippo,⁵¹ said the soul was water because it is of the nature of semen which is moist and liquid. Diogenes,⁵² on the other hand, said it was airy because he claims air is the principle of all things and is the most subtle and easily mobile thing. Heraclitus⁵³ asserted that it is a vapor which is between air and water. Others such as Critias⁵⁴ have asserted that the soul is blood. Still others, such as Alcmeon,⁵⁵ said it is of the nature of heaven because it is always moving, and for this reason he also said it was immortal because it has been assimilated to the immortal heavens. Others have claimed that the soul is some kind of number that is always moving itself. This opinion is attributed to Xenocrates, as Giles of

are not *actually* composed of an infinity of parts or a finite number of indivisible parts.

3. *A living being consists of a subject with accidents.* This view differs from the others in that it seems to admit the soul might be constituted by something more than a relation of atoms or the elements; i.e. it seems to admit that there might be qualities in living beings which cannot be explained structurally. Nevertheless such a view would also make living beings accidental unities, not *per-se* unities.

⁴⁹ Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Zurich: Weidmann, 1985), 67 A 28.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 67 A 28, 70 B 2.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 38 A 10.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 64 A 20.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 22 B 12.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 88 A 23.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 24 A 12.

Rome reports in [his commentary on *On the Soul*], Book I, text 28.⁵⁶ Archelaus,⁵⁷ the teacher of Socrates, said that soul is a type of power to move [things]. Anaxagoras⁵⁸ said the intellect was a separate and unmixed thing which moves other things, affirming that the soul has this nature. Hence has arisen the error of those who say that the soul is from the divine nature, as St. Thomas notes on this passage in text 23.⁵⁹ Thales⁶⁰ also said that the soul is something that produces movement; hence he said the magnet has a soul because it moves iron. Others such as Empedocles⁶¹ say the soul is composed of the four elements so that it can know all things for each thing is known by its like. Others, e.g. Empedocles, whom St. Thomas mentions in [his commentary on] text 55,⁶² have said that the soul is a harmony. By “harmony” they meant a certain proportion of powers and members. Others whom Aristotle mentions in text 86⁶³ said the soul is something diffused through the whole universe. Because of this Thales⁶⁴ maintained that the soul is full of gods. They thought that God is the soul of the world. Galen in his book *That the Character of the Soul Follows the Temperament of the Body*, Chapters 4 and 5⁶⁵ says that the soul is a mixture or proportion of the humors.⁶⁶ Cicero in Book I of

⁵⁶ *Super libros de anima cum textu* (Venice, 1496), folio 8, col. 2.

⁵⁷ Diels, 68 B 1.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 59 a 99, ff.

⁵⁹ *De an.*, I, lect. 3, n. 38.

⁶⁰ Diels, 11 A 22, 24 A 12.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 31 B 8. 9. 17. 26. 107. 109.

⁶² *De an.*, I, lect. 9, n. 134.

⁶³ *De an.*, 411 a 7 f. Aristotle does not give the names of any particular Presocratic philosopher who held this view except Thales.

⁶⁴ Diels, 11 A 22, 23.

⁶⁵ *Galenus opera ex septima iuntarum editione* (Venice, 1597), I cl., folios 318-319.

⁶⁶ A reference to the so called “four humors”. These were chemical substances posited by ancient and medieval thinkers to provide a physical account for seemingly innate differences of temperament in different people.

the *Tusculan Disputations*⁶⁷ says that the soul is perpetual motion, and he attributes this to Aristotle explaining the word “entelecheia” as “motion”. Angelus Politian defends this interpretation in Book I, chapter 1 of his *Miscellanea*⁶⁸ as does Rodolfus in Book I, Chapter 12 of *On Invention*,⁶⁹ and Franciscus Floridus in his *Apology Against the Disparagers of the Latin Language*.⁷⁰ Plato said with great obscurity that the soul is some kind of harmonic number composed of the principles of things which are: sameness and difference, unity and duality. He holds this opinion in the *Timaeus*.⁷¹ St. Thomas⁷² and Giles of Rome⁷³ argue in many places for the opposite opinion [in their commentaries on *On the Soul*].

5 Aristotle, who first discovered the truth regarding substantial forms, or at least was the first to explain them, holds that the soul is not an accident nor some kind of body nor matter but the substantial form, not of anything whatsoever, but of a living body.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ I, 10, 22.

⁶⁸ *Opera omnia* (Basil, 1553), pp. 224-228.

⁶⁹ *Rodolphus Agricola de inventione dialectica libri tres* (Cologne, 1527), p. 57.

⁷⁰ *Contra latinae linguae scriptorum calumniatores* (Basil, 1540), p. 74.

⁷¹ 37 a.

⁷² *De an.*, I, lect. 8 ff.

⁷³ *In libros de anima expositio* (Venice, 1500), I, 55: folio 16, col. I.

⁷⁴ Roughly speaking, we can say that for Suarez “matter”, in general, refers to any more or less determinate thing insofar as it is capable of further determination, while “form” refers to the intrinsic determination of any determinable thing. There are two kinds of matter, prime matter, which is not an actual substance (though, according to Suarez, it does have some actuality of its own), and secondary matter, which is a substance that is capable of further accidental determination. Correspondingly there are two kinds of form, substantial form, which is that which intrinsically determines matter, actualizing its capacity to be the “body” of some sort of material substance or other, and accidental form, which actualizes the capacity of some *already existing* substance to be of such and such a sort. According to most Scholastics the term “soul” refers, in general, to the substantial form of any living being.

6 *And this is the answer to this question.*--- Aristotle begins the proof of this from the division of substance into matter, form, and composite which is set forth in Book I of the *Physics*⁷⁵ and in Question 3 of Book II.⁷⁶ This division presupposes another which Aristotle also intimates, namely that among entities some are substantial and others are accidental.⁷⁷

7 The first part of the answer⁷⁸ is proven by Aristotle from the fact that the animate thing is substantial; in fact it is among the most perfect substantial composites. However the soul is that by which a living thing is [intrinsically] made to be a living thing, and [a living thing] is a substantial entity.⁷⁹

Likewise, because the soul is the first principle of all perfections and operations of a living thing as such, it is not an accident.⁸⁰ The antecedent is obvious from what has been said. The consequence⁸¹ is

⁷⁵ 189 b 30-191 a 22.

⁷⁶ 193 a 28-b 8.

⁷⁷ *De an.*, 412 a 6, 412 a 11. A substance, for Suarez, is an essence to which it is due to exist in itself, while an accident is an essence to which it is due to exist in another. Suarez thought there are non-modal accidents and these could, by divine power, be sustained in being without inhering in any substance. Nevertheless, such accidents would still be essentially ordered to inhering in a substance, nor could they be sustained outside their natural substrates by anything less than absolute efficient causal power of God.

⁷⁸ That is, that the soul is not an accident.

⁷⁹ *De an.*, 412 a 11-21.

⁸⁰ This argument rests on a principle that is self-evident for Suarez since, according to him, the substantial form of anything is simply that which is the first principle of all its perfections and operations. See *MD XV*, Section 1, para. 18-19.

⁸¹ The "consequence" is just the hypothetical proposition "If the soul is the first principle of all perfections and operations of a living being, then it is not an accident". Suarez seems to be arguing as follows.

1. If the soul is the first principle of all perfections and operations of a living being, then it is not an accident.

also obvious for activities and intrinsic powers are founded in the substance of a thing. For other proofs in confirmation of this⁸² one should go to Book I of the *Physics*.⁸³ Thus the Commentator says on this passage in text 2,⁸⁴ "it is unthinkable that the soul is an accident."⁸⁵ St. Thomas develops this extensively in Book II of *Contra Gentes*, Chapter 63.

8 *Proof of the second part of the answer.*---The soul is the first principle of operations. Matter cannot be this principle because matter is common to all natural things which is not true of this principle.

Moreover, as long as matter remains the same, a thing remains dead. And in the same way it is obvious that the soul is not body since "body" is taken either as matter with accidents or as a composite of matter and substantial form. If it is taken in the first way, it is certain that it is not a principle of life because it is not so either by reason of matter or by reason of its accidents, as has been shown. But if it is taken in the second way, then, if the operations of life are due to such a composite from its nature, it will be something living--still the whole will not be the soul because not all the components of that composite are principles of life since matter is not; the soul, therefore, is the substantial form.

2. But the soul is the first principle of all perfections and operations of a living being.
3. Therefore the soul is not an accident.

By the "antecedent" Suarez means to refer to the second premise of this argument, by the "consequence" he means to refer to the first premise of it.

⁸² That is that the operations and intrinsic powers of a thing are founded in its substantial nature and, hence, *ultimately*, in its substantial form.

⁸³ 185 a 20-25 and *passim* in *Physics A*.

⁸⁴ Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis de anima libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), folio xxxiii, II2, 130, 16 ff.

⁸⁵ In holding that the soul is not an accident, the Scholastics were, in fact, holding that it is, itself, a substantial sort of entity, and not a property trope inhering in an already existing substance.

The conclusion can be proven in another way. For the soul is that by which a living thing is constituted in the being of a living thing. That however cannot be body nor matter; it is therefore form. The minor is obvious because that principle constitutes a living thing by actualizing the matter to which it is united. From this union there results the living composite which is a true substantial entity, essentially one. Body however cannot be the act of matter, firstly because it cannot actualize matter and secondly because that body will be a subsistent thing and a complete substance, which would contradict the act of matter.⁸⁶

Thirdly, Aristotle argues in Chapter 2⁸⁷ [of *On the Soul*] that that which is the first principle of all activities and powers of a composite is its substantial form, but in living things the soul is the first principle of all powers and activities of the living thing. It is, therefore, their substantial form. The minor is obvious from the common conception set forth above. The proof of the major is that everything acts according to its actuality and perfection. Hence a more perfect activity argues for a more perfect substance and essence. Therefore the activity flows from the essence of a thing and not from the matter because matter is common. Therefore [it flows] from the form.

9 Perhaps someone will say that the soul is the principle of operations not as form but as something that moves extrinsically. This, however, cannot be maintained because a living thing which is essentially one integral substance differs in kind from non-living substances, and it transcends those substances. Therefore it is constituted in being as a living thing by a true form.

⁸⁶ No act of matter can be a complete substance because a complete substance cannot be ordered to perfecting or actualizing something else since it is a complete and fully actual being in itself.

⁸⁷ *De an.*, 413 b 10-13.

Likewise vital operations must not only be received in the very thing that acts, but they must also be caused by the intrinsic principle of the thing that acts. The activities of life differ in this from non-living activities. The movement of the heaven⁸⁸ is not a vital movement because, although it is received in the heaven, it nevertheless proceeds from an extrinsic intelligence which is only united to the heaven through the instrumentality of a mover. Therefore this union is not sufficient for the nature of a soul, but it is necessary that the soul itself compose intrinsically the substance of the living thing.⁸⁹

This is corroborated by experience. For truly it is I who see, and the plant itself that grows. Therefore these activities proceed from these supposites according to those things that unify their substances. [They do not proceed] from the matter; therefore from the form.

10 *The stated conclusion is obvious*---It is clear that Aristotle harbored no doubts about it although the final words of the first chapter⁹⁰ [of *On the Soul*], which we set forth at the beginning of the question, intimated doubt. Although these words have been explained in various

⁸⁸ By the "heaven" Suarez meant to refer, roughly, to what we call outer space. But his concept of what we call outer space differed from ours in several ways. First it differed in that Suarez held that the Earth is at the center of the universe. Second it differed in that Suarez held that planets other than Earth are made of a different sort of matter from the sort of matter that Earth and earthly things are made of. "Heavenly" matter, so to speak, was thought by Suarez and most of the Schoolmen to be incorruptible. Finally, Suarez's concept of what we call outer space differed from ours in that he held that the planets are moved by "separated substances" (i.e. certain sorts of angels), not by the force of gravity.

⁸⁹ The angelic minds that the Scholastics thought move the stars and the planets were conceived by them to be extrinsic agents that move those bodies in the way a man might move a large rock or a pilot his ship. They were thus not substantially united to the planets and stars they moved and so were not the souls of such bodies.

⁹⁰ *De an.*, 414 a 12 ff; cf. *De an.*, 413 b 10-13.

ways, nevertheless, I understand them thus: Aristotle had said in the first chapter that the soul is form or act; he had not proven, however, that it is a true informing act and so proceeded to prove this in the second chapter.⁹¹ He said at the end, "It is not yet obvious," that is it has not yet been shown that the soul truly informs. It's as if he said: and so this will have to be proven in the following chapter and he immediately proceeds to the proof.

11 From this it is clear that the word "*entelecheia*" is rightly taken to mean act and form, which we observed in the *Physics*. Hence Cicero's interpretation is not appropriate,⁹² and Budaeus was completely right to reject it in book 1 of *De asse*.⁹³ Cicero's interpretation is without doubt contrary to the mind of Aristotle since he [i.e. Aristotle] set forth first the division of substance into matter, form and composite, and he concluded that the soul is form, and he compares it to knowledge. Likewise, the manner of definition and proof reveals his intention.

The replies to the arguments set forth in the beginning⁹⁴ will easily result from what is about to be said.⁹⁵

⁹¹ *De an.*, 412 a 19-21.

⁹² Above, in paragraph 4, Suarez asserted that Cicero interpreted "*entelecheia*" to mean motion.

⁹³ Guillelmus Budaeus, *De esse et partibus ejus* (Venice, 1522), I I, folio 9.

⁹⁴ These were the arguments, presented in section 1 of the present question, that Suarez considered for the view that the soul is not a substantial form.

⁹⁵ I.e. in questions 3 and 4.

Question 2

Whether and in what way the soul is first act

1 The answer to this question is affirmative as Aristotle infers in chapter 1 of this work⁹⁶ from the answer to the preceding question. In explaining this it ought to be noted that, although only [prime] matter has the nature of pure potency⁹⁷ and, indeed, the other things which supervene on it have the nature of act, nevertheless, among them the act of one supposes that of another, and one emanates from another.⁹⁸ In the same way, that act which is presupposed for a second act is said to be first act, and that act which follows from another is said to be second act in comparison with the first. On account of this it can happen that one and the same act is both first and second with respect to different things. For if habit is compared to power, it is second act with respect to power, and power is first act [with respect to habit]. If,

⁹⁶ *De an.* 412 a 27 ff.; b 5 f.

⁹⁷ That prime matter has the nature of pure potency, in the sense of not possessing *any* actuality of its own, was accepted by many Schoolmen; they felt it could not function as the continuant in substantial changes if it were not purely potential. Suarez, however, disagreed with this view and held that matter must have *some* actuality, however minimal, since, if it did not, it would not be anything real at all and so could not combine with form to constitute a composite material substance. Thus, when Suarez says that matter is pure potency, he means that 1) there is no more ultimate subject it could inform or actualize and 2) it is bereft of any of the characteristic qualities of complete material substances (e.g. color, shape, texture, etc.), of quantity, and of the power to *efficiently* causally effect or affect other things.

⁹⁸ That one emanates from another means for Suarez that the first is naturally ordered to *efficiently* cause the second *in* the subject it informs and will do so unless prevented to by some external cause or by an indisposition in the subject it informs (e.g., if a person is born without eyes, her soul cannot produce in her the power to see, though it is naturally ordered to).

however, habit is compared to act⁹⁹ it has the nature of first act because habit elicits act.¹⁰⁰

2 Hence act can be distinguished in three ways. First there is that act which is absolutely first, that is, which is second with respect to no other act; and substantial form is act in this way.¹⁰¹ Next there is that act which is absolutely second, that is, which is in no way first; such an act can be called "ultimate act". Activity is an act of this sort. Third there is that act which is relatively primary and secondary; and power and habit are acts of this sort. This kind of act is called intermediate act.

The soul, therefore, is said to be first act in the first way, and thus Aristotle says that the soul is that by which we primarily live,¹⁰² that is, that by which we are primarily in the nature of the living, or that by which we primarily act vitally. And thus he contrasts the soul with knowledge, which is an intermediate act,¹⁰³ and he says that the soul is a prior act [to knowledge] because it is absolutely first.

⁹⁹ In this passage "act" means "activity".

¹⁰⁰ The idea is that there are degrees of actuality and potency. The rational power of the soul is thus an actuality relative to the essence of the soul itself and is closer, so to speak, to a rational act, than the soul is itself. Again, an intellectual habit, knowledge of logic for instance, directly disposes the rational power of the soul to making logical inferences, and so is itself an act relative to the rational power. An actual logical inference is an ultimate act and is not in potency relative to any further act.

¹⁰¹ The idea is that the soul gives substantial being to a living thing by actualizing matter and is the root of all of the vital powers of a living thing. Thus it is the first actuality of a living thing, and there is no more ultimate or prior actuality in a living thing with respect to it in the way the soul itself is prior to the powers that emanate from it.

¹⁰² *De an.* 414 a 12-14.

¹⁰³ Knowledge is an intermediate act because it is a habit that perfects the power of reason. Thus, for example, a person who has knowledge of geometry possesses a habit which enables her to infer geometrical theorems from axioms even when she is not actually doing so.

3 *Whether first act is more perfect than second act.*---What has been said seems to suffice to answer the question. There are, however, two arguments against the conclusion.

First, that the soul ought to be the most perfect act; second act, however, is more perfect than first act. Therefore the soul is second act, not first. The minor¹⁰⁴ is clear because second act is the end of first act; the end, however, is more perfect.¹⁰⁵

Likewise, happiness, which is the highest good, consists in second act, according to Aristotle, [*Nicomachean Ethics*, book 1, chapter 11¹⁰⁶ and book 10, chapters 6 and 7.¹⁰⁷

Likewise, merit and demerit consist in second act, according to St. Thomas in [*Summa theologiae*] 1.2, q. 71, a. 3, who says that a wicked act is more sinful than a wicked habit.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Laid out formally the objection Suarez here considers is as follows:

1. The soul is the most perfect of all acts.
2. Every second act is more perfect than any first act.
3. Therefore, the soul is a second act.

The minor premise of this argument is that every second act is more perfect than any first act.

¹⁰⁵ The objection is that the substantial form of a thing, since it is, as it were, potential with respect to powers, habits, and activities, is less perfect than powers, habits and activities. But the soul is what is most perfect in a living being. Hence, the soul of a living being ought to be identified with its activities, not with its substantial form. This sort of dynamic objection to the substantialism Suarez upheld adumbrates views of the person that can be found in such later thinkers as Locke, Lotze, and Ritschl and echoes, in a way, the ancient Buddhist "no-self" doctrine.

¹⁰⁶ 1101 b 3-9.

¹⁰⁷ 1176 a 33-b 1; 1177 a 12.

¹⁰⁸ This adumbrates a view found in Ritschl that the personhood of a person should be identified, not with the "inert" substance lying "behind her acts" but with her developed personality, i.e. with her moral character. It is even more radical than Ritschl's view of the nature of a person, however, since it identifies personhood, not with a rational substance's *moral character* or any

Likewise, those things which are prior in generation are more imperfect; first act, however, is prior in generation. Therefore first act is more imperfect than second act.¹⁰⁹ Likewise, that act is more perfect which more completely does away with the potentiality of the subject. Second act, however, is an act of this sort, for it so actualizes a subject that there is no remaining potentiality in it.

This is confirmed by the fact that an act of charity is more perfect than the habit of charity, and the vision of God is more perfect than the light of glory.¹¹⁰ Therefore, [second act is more perfect than first act].

The second argument is that every first act is separable from second act.¹¹¹ But the soul is not always separable from its operation,

other of her habits, but with her *activities*. In this way, then, it is perhaps even closer to Hume's view of the person and to the Buddhist "no-self" doctrine than Ritschl's teaching is. It differs from Hume and the Buddhists, however, in not denying the existence of permanent substances that are able to acquire qualities and perform activities.

¹⁰⁹ The substantial form of a baby, for instance, is generated before the baby's ability to speak is. But since a baby is less developed than a child who is able to speak, the very soul of a person should not be identified with her substantial form. Many contemporary thinkers who identify what it is to be a person with a set of properties or powers (e.g. Mary Anne Warren and Michael Tooley) seem to hold a view similar to the view Suarez is considering here.

¹¹⁰ The light of glory is the divine essence itself taken as united to the soul of one of the blessed. It elevates the soul and enables it to directly *perceive* the divine essence, though not, of course, to *comprehend* it.

¹¹¹ Whereas the first objection Suarez considered to the view that the soul is the first act of a living being seems based on a dynamism that is hostile to the sort of substantialist ontology Suarez upheld, this objection is based on a certain notion of the independent nature of substances. According to it, every substance and, hence, every substantial constituent of every substance, must be able to exist without the compliment of those activities that follow upon the essential nature of a substance. The implicit principle that this is based on is that the accidental features of a thing, including its activities, depend on the thing and the thing's constituents; hence the thing and its constituents can exist without those features, but not *vice versa*.

as is plain in the case of the vegetative soul. The soul, therefore, is not essentially first act.

4 Concerning the first argument Cajetan¹¹² says that first act-and the same holds of the soul-is materially more perfect,¹¹³ that is, it is more perfect according to its entity; but that second act is more perfect formally, that is, in the nature of act and the mode of actualizing because it destroys all potency. With this argument he concludes that all second acts are more perfect than primary acts.¹¹⁴ But he is without doubt making a mistake in a matter that is not difficult.

Others distinguish between two kinds of first act, namely first act that is of the same order as second act and which is immediately ordered to second act as an end, and powers and habits are of this sort. This sort of first act, they say, is less perfect¹¹⁵ than second act. The other sort of first act is, indeed, in a different genus, and it is not ordered to [any other] act but to constituting the essential nature of the thing. This sort of act, [they say], is more perfect than second act.

¹¹² *De an.* II 1, *Commentaria in de anima Aristotelis*, ed. P. Coquell (Rome, 1938-39), t. 11, pp. 29 f.

¹¹³ That first act is *materially* more perfect than second act means that it is more perfect with respect to independence and permanence. That second act is more perfect *formally* means that it is more perfect precisely *as an act* or *actualization* of some potency. For a Thomist like Cajetan part of what makes every created thing imperfect is that every created thing must intrinsically rely on second acts to achieve those perfections they are by nature ordered to. This is not true of God, who as the perfect being, is pure act.

¹¹⁴ Suarez must mean to attribute to Cajetan the view that all second acts are more perfect than first acts precisely taken *as acts*, but are not more perfect in every respect than all first acts.

¹¹⁵ Although all known texts here say "more perfect" the sense demands "less perfect".

But this distinction is also false because habit is more perfect than act.¹¹⁶

5 *Conclusion.*--- Consequently, I say universally that the first act of any genus, insofar as it is in itself, is absolutely more perfect than second act, even with respect to the nature of act.

This conclusion is proven in the following ways:

1. It is proven with respect to first acts taken absolutely, *contra* Cajetan. For that is a more perfect act in the nature of act, which more perfectly actualizes. But the soul and other similar first acts are of this sort. Therefore, [they are all more perfect than any second acts]. The minor is proven, for to actualize is to give being; therefore that act which gives more perfect being more perfectly actualizes. But truly an act which is absolutely first gives more perfect being since it gives substantial being.¹¹⁷ Therefore, [first act is absolutely more perfect than second act.]

2. To actualize is to do away with the potentiality of a subject; therefore that act which does away with a greater potentiality is more perfect in the nature of act. Of this sort, however, is the act which is absolutely first with respect to subsequent acts because it does away with the substantial potentiality of matter, which is the greatest poten-

¹¹⁶ Unlike those Scholastics he here criticizes, Suarez was univocal with respect to the perfection of any first act *vis à vis* any second act. According to him, every sort of first act is *absolutely* speaking more perfect than *every* sort of second act. Thus he thinks the soul is more perfect than the powers it emanates in the substance it informs, than the habits that inform those powers, and than the activities such habits enable a rational substance to perform. But he also thinks that powers are more perfect than both habits and activities and that habits are more perfect than activities, at least absolutely speaking.

¹¹⁷ This argument is rooted in the idea that substantial being is more perfect than accidental being; it is more perfect because by it a thing exists *in itself* and not *in another*.

tiality.¹¹⁸ Therefore [first act is absolutely more perfect than second act.]

3. The whole essence of acts and forms consists in their aptitude for actualizing; therefore, that form which in its own essence and entity is more perfect will also be more perfect in the nature of act.--- These arguments demolish the distinction of Cajetan.¹¹⁹

6 Indeed that relative first act,¹²⁰ which by others is said to be in the same genus as second act, is also more perfect than second act, is proven in the following ways.

For the intellect is more perfect than understanding. It is, to be sure, a much better quality than understanding and is, as it were, an equivocal cause of all actions; which well explains its eminence over all acts, because all acts are, as it were, participations of the first act itself. The intellect, however, is, as it were, the font and origin of all second acts.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ See note 97 above.

¹¹⁹ That distinction was between perfection relative to permanence and independence and perfection relative to actualization. Suarez thinks that the soul, taken as first act, is not only more perfect than any second act relative to permanence and independence, but also relative to actualization since it gives *actual substantial being* to a thing and since it actualizes matter, which is a pure potency.

¹²⁰ Suarez is here referring to powers and habits, and by "habits" he means those acquired abilities which perfect a person's intellect and will so that he is able to perform easily and well those activities his rational soul naturally fits him to perform. Traditionally such habits were divided into purely theoretical ones (e.g., the knowledge of geometry, philosophy, physics, etc.) and practical ones (e.g. moral virtue, skill at building, or playing an instrument, etc.)

¹²¹ The idea is that, since the power in virtue of which any person understands whatever she does understand is her intellect, her intellect has greater perfection than any habit she may acquire. For what, at least proximately, enables

Similarly, habit is more perfect than a single act. To be sure a subject is better disposed to the whole of some body of knowledge through which it is rendered absolutely knowing than through a single act [of knowing] alone.¹²²

And this is confirmed. For habit effectively elicits all acts; but an effecting form is more perfect; hence acts only dispositively act together for the production of habits.¹²³

This is further confirmed in another way. For habits, powers, and acts take their perfection from their objects;¹²⁴ but habit and power maintain a more lasting relation to their own objects under more universal and more lasting principles than act does;¹²⁵ therefore, [habit and power are more perfect than act].

her to acquire any theoretical or practical habit is her intellect, even if ultimately it is her rational soul itself that so enables her.

¹²² In other words, in virtue of his knowledge of mathematics, a skilled mathematician can actually demonstrate many mathematical theorems he is not currently demonstrating. Thus a knowledge of mathematics is more perfect than the act of demonstrating any particular mathematical theorem. Again, in virtue of her acquired knowledge of how to sing, a skilled opera singer is able to sing very difficult arias, even ones she has never sung before. Thus her acquired skill in singing is more perfect than any particular act of singing she may perform.

¹²³ An effecting form is a form in virtue of which a substance can actually do or produce something. On the other hand, a disposing form is a form rendering a subject fit to receive some perfection that is efficiently produced by an effecting form. Thus, for instance, the heat that a smith remotely causes in metal by exposing it to fire, is a disposing form enabling the smith to efficiently introduce the shape of a sword, or any other metal artifact he may wish to create, into that metal.

¹²⁴ Every power has an object and its object is either something it really acts on or, at any rate, something that it in some way respects. Thus the intellect itself has an object and that object might be said to be "everything insofar as it is intelligible". The more perfect a power is, the more perfect its object is.

¹²⁵ The idea is that a good habit, i.e., a habit perfective of some power, enables a person who possesses it to act in a more perfect way than a person

7 Consequently, in order to evade the deception, which here intervenes, it is necessary to distinguish that which first act bestows by itself from that which second act bestows by itself alone. In looking at the matter this way we find that that which first act bestows is more perfect than that which second act bestows alone, and that it educes a thing from greater potentiality to act than second act by itself does. But, because second act supposes first act and a thing constituted under second act always has a more perfect mode than a thing constituted under first act alone because it has been completed—since activity is, as it were, the completion of a thing—therefore, it is judged [by some] that second act is more perfect than first act. But this is false, because it does not compare first act to second act only, but to first and second act simultaneously; hence a thing constituted in second act is more perfect than a thing constituted in first act not because of second act alone but because it has both first and second act. Nevertheless, if we consider each act itself with precision, according to that which it bestows in itself, there is no doubt that first act more perfectly actualizes than second act, as the [above] arguments showed.¹²⁶ You will find an example of this in Aristotle, the *Posterior Analytics*, book

who does not. Thus, if Mary is an accomplished pianist, she is able to produce, over and over again, excellent acts of playing the piano, while a non-accomplished pianist will not be able to do that even if she might, on occasion, play a piece very well by accident, as it were.

¹²⁶ This argument of Suarez illuminates all he has said against the view that the soul is a kind of second act and is based on certain fundamental tenets of his mereology. Suarez believed that that there are true composite wholes, but he held that every whole, whether substantial or not, is made of parts which have some true entity of their own. Thus, according to Suarez, every whole is greater than any of its parts in that it *includes* those parts. But Suarez would deny that a whole is greater than the *sum* of all its parts, *if* that sum is taken to *include* the modes by which the other parts of the whole are united, those modes being themselves quasi parts of the whole. Thus Suarez here admits that the whole consisting of a human person and her accidental perfections is greater than any of the "parts" of such a whole, but he denies that the accidental perfections of a person, *taken by themselves*, are greater than either the person or her rational soul.

1, chapter 2,¹²⁷ where he asserts that he is better disposed who has understanding of [first] principles than he who has knowledge.¹²⁸ This is understood by taking precisely that which each habit bestows as all the commentators explain in their commentaries on this passage. Aristotle,¹²⁹ and St. Thomas,¹³⁰ and others, when they seem to prefer second act to first, do not compare those acts with precision, but with the state of a thing existing in first or second act, for between these the state of existing in second act is better, and, therefore, beatitude consists in such a state. In this way also the mode of action is said to be the end of a thing, that is, the thing acting. For action is more ordered to the perfection of the one acting than the other way around. We have written about this in [our commentary on the *Physics*] book 2, q. 4, "On Causes", and St. Thomas explains it optimally in [the *Summa contra gentiles*], book 3, chapter 17, ad. 7;¹³¹ and in [the *Summa theologiae*] 1 p., q. 44, a. 4, ad 2; Cajetan in his [commentary on the *Summa theologiae*] 1.2 p, q 3, a 2.¹³²

8 Consequently, I deny the minor premise of the first argument,¹³³ and, indeed, the arguments that have been offered in support of it are weak.¹³⁴ But concerning this it should be noted:

¹²⁷ 72 a 25-b 4.

¹²⁸ Aristotle was a foundationalist and so, for him, all knowledge is a kind of deduction from first principles (e.g., "the whole is greater than its parts", "from nothing nothing comes", etc.). Therefore, first principles are the cognitive basis of all the intellectual disciplines and the person who possesses them firmly is able to acquire knowledge of all such disciplines.

¹²⁹ Cf. above notes 106 and 107.

¹³⁰ *S.T.*, 1.2, q. 71, a. 3.

¹³¹ "That all things are ordered towards one end which is God."

¹³² *S. Thomae Aquinatis summa theologiae cum commentariis Thomae de Vio...* (Rome, 1888-1903), 1.2, q. 3, a. 2.

¹³³ The first argument Suarez considered for the view that the soul is not a first act is as follows:

1. The soul is the most perfect sort of act.
2. Every second act is more perfect than any first act.

1. It is one thing to compare habit to act with respect to the essential nature, and another to compare them with respect to moral good or evil. We here speak in the first way, for in the second way action, and not habit, is good or bad; and thus an action is meritorious or demeritorious. The reason is that these types of good and evil are founded on freedom; acts, however, are formally free but not habits except insofar as they have been acquired through a free act.¹³⁵ And in this way one ought to understand the text of St. Thomas cited above.¹³⁶

2. It should be noted concerning the final words of the arguments that the vision of God, although it is second act, seems more perfect than the light of glory for it has the same adequate object and regards it in a more perfect way.

Moreover, the light of glory itself is not a principal of first act but is the divine essence itself united in some miraculous way with the beatified intellect, constituting it in first act and concurring with it to effect [the beatific] vision.

3. It should be noted that second act can be said to be more perfect than first act in some sense insofar as first act is compared to

3. Therefore, the soul is a kind of second act.

Suarez wishes to deny premise 2 of this argument.

¹³⁴ Suarez is here referring to the arguments he listed in section 2 in support of the proposition that every second act is more perfect than any first act.

¹³⁵ Suarez was a resolute libertarian with respect to metaphysical freedom who held that only actions strictly speaking are free and that the only sorts of actions that are free are those which proceed from a power such that, all the requisites for acting having been posited, the person possessed of that power can either act or hold herself back from acting. Good and bad moral habits can, of course, be acquired by performing good and bad actions, but the habits are not themselves free in the strict sense since they are not actions.

¹³⁶ *Summa theologiae*, 1.2, q. 71, a. 3, cited in this question above, section 3.

second as potency to the act through which it is perfected, and as such it is less perfect than second act in some sense.

Likewise, second act is a sign of greater perfection, and also has a certain singular perfection insofar as it is the ultimate completion of a thing; nevertheless, first act is absolutely more perfect [than second act].

9 Concerning the second argument¹³⁷ Cajetan has much to say¹³⁸ and distinguishes two kinds of first act: one is that which is distinguished from second but is nevertheless inseparably conjoined with it. Another is that first act which is distinguished from second and can be separated from it.

The form of fire is an example of the first kind; it is distinguished from its own activity, nevertheless because it acts naturally it is thus always conjoined with its activity. -The rational soul; which is able to cease from acting, is an example of the second kind of first act.

Having made this distinction Cajetan says:

1. Aristotle means that the soul is first act in the second way, that is, it is an act which is able to cease operating. This is clear because Aristotle says that first act is like one who is sleeping because it implies a cessation of activity.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ The second argument Suarez considered for the view that the soul is not a first act is as follows:

1. Every first act can be separated from all the second acts it is the principle of.
2. The soul is not always separable from all the second acts it is the principle of.
3. The soul is not a first act.

¹³⁸ *De an.* II 1, nn. 13-24: *op. cit.*, t. II, pp. 19-29.

¹³⁹ *De an.* 412 a 22-28.

Furthermore, that the soul is first act in the second way was so obvious that it did not need the exposition of Aristotle to be established.

2. He [Cajetan] says that the soul being first act in the second way pertains to the definition of the soul, and it applies to every sort of soul, either through non contradiction [to its nature] or a certain indeterminacy on the part of activity; that is, because although not every soul is able to cease from every second act, nevertheless, there is no soul which is unable to cease from some activity.

And this can be confirmed. For to be able to cease from activity is a sign of perfection; but to be necessitated to act is a great imperfection, which is a characteristic of all inanimate forms. Therefore, when a soul as such exceeds the degree of inanimate form, it ought to have a greater power over its own activities, and thus it will be able to cease from acting. This perfection will be more or less in diverse animals, according to the measure of their perfection. For instance, the rational soul, because it is most perfect, has perfect dominion over its activity and is able to cease from activity in proportion to its freedom. But, to be sure, the sensitive soul, although it does not have freedom, nevertheless, intrinsically has a certain way of ceasing from activity, either through sleep or desire. The vegetative soul, which is more imperfect, is indeed more subjected to its activity; nevertheless it is able to cease from many activities, as when a living thing attains its full size it ceases to grow.

10 These and other points are expounded upon by commentators, and they are not entirely superfluous because they are worth knowing in themselves; nevertheless they are attributed to Aristotle without any reason, because he never dreamed of distinguishing in this passage between separable and inseparable acts, but he only wished to teach

that the soul is first act in the same way as any other substantial form, whether it is separable or not.¹⁴⁰

11 *Reasons in support of the view that this is Aristotle's meaning:*

The first reason is that the distinction between [different sorts] of first acts is not found in Aristotle because an act is not said to be first insofar as it is separable or inseparable from second act, but insofar as it first actualizes [a thing] and is the root of second act.

Likewise, Aristotle proves here¹⁴¹ that the soul is first act from this only that it is the first principle of vital activities; he does not prove, however, whether it is separable or not.

Likewise, Aristotle¹⁴² composes the definition of the soul by gathering beliefs which are acknowledged by all, namely that in living beings there are some operations of which the soul is the principle. Therefore, he understands first act in a most certain and well known way, not in an obscure and dubious way.

Likewise, from the division made of substances into matter, form, etc., Aristotle infers¹⁴³ "soul" to be first act in the manner of form, and he makes "form" to be the genus, as it were, in the definition of the soul, and takes first act as that which is common to all substantial forms. And this is the way St. Thomas,¹⁴⁴ Albert,¹⁴⁵ Them-

¹⁴⁰ Suarez is here implicitly denying the view that a substance must be naturally able to exist without the accompaniment of any second acts.

¹⁴¹ *De an.* 414 a 12 ff. Cf. *De an.* 413 b 10-13.

¹⁴² *De an.* 413 b 10-13.

¹⁴³ *De an.* 412 a 19-22.

¹⁴⁴ *De an.* II, lect. 1 and 2.

¹⁴⁵ *De an.* II 1, 1, *op. cit.*, t. 5, pp. 191 ff.

istius in book 2, chapters 2 and 4,¹⁴⁶ and ancient authors explain this passage.

Moreover, the example concerning sleep is put forward by Aristotle¹⁴⁷ because in sleep one can best distinguish the principle of operation from the operation itself. And this was rather apt in explaining the point, namely that the soul is, in itself, the kind of act which remains with the ceasing of operation. Nevertheless, Aristotle did not intend to teach that all souls are intrinsically capable of existing in the way the soul of a sleeping person exists. And it is not established that this is known because definitions ought to be very clear and, above all, because this definition was not known to the ancients.

12 But leaving aside what Aristotle had in mind, let us see what is true in reality. In the first place, it should be noted that to be able to cease from activity either proceeds from an intrinsic perfection, as in free beings, or it sometimes proceeds, in fact, from something extrinsic, either from a defect in the active power of a thing,¹⁴⁸ or because a thing is not able to receive an act,¹⁴⁹ or because of an impediment.¹⁵⁰ The latter way of ceasing to act points to an imperfection, and it is common to all natural agents. Thus concerning this point there is no question.

13 *Whether it is of the nature of the rational soul to have some mode of ceasing from operation which proceeds from a perfection.* But there is doubt whether it is of the nature of the soul to have some way of ceasing from activity which proceeds from perfection. The re-

¹⁴⁶ *In libros...de anima...* (Venice, 1542), pp. 248 ff.

¹⁴⁷ *De an.* 412 a 22-28.

¹⁴⁸ For example, if a person became hard of hearing-this, of course, would arise from the material, not the formal, element of the power of hearing.

¹⁴⁹ For example, a diamond, by its nature, is incapable of thinking.

¹⁵⁰ For example, a person is unable to see his enemy because his enemy is on the other side of a brick wall.

sponse to this is that it does not belong to the nature of the soul as such.

Proof: The soul as such does not necessarily transcend the order of agents acting by the necessity of their nature without any cognition; therefore, the power of dominating its actions does not belong to the nature of the soul.

Also, that which is of the nature of the soul must belong to every soul, but certainly it does not belong to the vegetative soul to be able to cease from acting. For the vegetative soul is always subject to its own operation, as we will make clear below,¹⁵¹ and if it ceases, it ceases from imperfection, namely because its power is terminated.¹⁵² Hence, not only is it able to cease but it is necessitated to cease. This manifestly shows an imperfection [in such a soul], and certainly a greater imperfection than to be necessitated to act. Although, therefore, this type of soul has a mode of being and an end in its actions, nevertheless it always performs them with absolute necessity.

Therefore, to be a first act of the second type is not of the essence of the soul as such because what is of the essence of the soul is found in every particular soul.

*Cajetan Replies:*¹⁵³ It is found through non contradiction [in the soul]; for whatever soul, insofar as it is a soul, it is not a contraction that it be first act in that way¹⁵⁴---But this is not valid, for what is

¹⁵¹ Suarez discusses the vegetative soul at length in Disputation 2, question 1, which has not been included in this translation.

¹⁵² For example if it reaches its full height and cannot grow any further or, alternately if something extrinsic to it prevents it from growing to its full height.

¹⁵³ *De an.* II 1, n. 16, *op. cit.*, t. II, pp. 21 ff.

¹⁵⁴ The idea seems to be that it would not be impossible for God to conserve the substance of any living thing in separation from all of its activities, i.e.

essential, and especially for a thing so perfect, must positively belong to it.¹⁵⁵ I will have much more to say on this matter in another passage similar to this one.

Therefore, to be first act in the second way can be predicated of the soul in common in an indefinite way, as an inferior of a superior. And thus it is predicated accidentally, as it were, or in the manner of a contracting difference, which is not able to be placed in the definition of the genus [of the soul]. It is able, nevertheless, to be attributed to the soul in general, namely, because it is intrinsically contractible to a special nature of soul to which it belongs to be first act in the second way, and in this the soul surpasses, as such, the form of the inanimate as such, for the form of the inanimate is not contractible to the nature of a form having dominion over its own activity, since inanimate forms, in all their latitude, are bound to their activity.¹⁵⁶ But, indeed, the soul is so contractible because in its extension we come upon forms having those perfections, which proves that the soul is constituted in a higher grade of being.

God could conserve a plant in such a way that it existed without performing any vital actions.

¹⁵⁵ Suarez thinks that, in order to hold that something is predicable of a certain sort of thing, it is not enough that it would not be contradictory for that thing to have the property being predicated of it—rather, it must be the case that the thing actually possess, or at least is naturally *able* to possess, that property.

¹⁵⁶ Suarez is here speaking of the way in which the species may be predicated of the genus or the individual of the species. This might seem to run utterly contrary to Aristotle's thought; nevertheless, Aristotle did allow that there is a way in which such predications may be held to be true. We can say, for instance, that man as such is white because *some* men are. The nature of man, in other words, does not preclude whiteness, in the way in which the nature of a raven does, even though not all men are white. Similarly, we can predicate rationality of soul as such, since some souls are rational. Thus the nature of soul as such, though it does not include rationality, does not exclude it, in the way the nature of inanimate things, taken in general, does.

And this responds to the argument given above by Cajetan. For although the grade of the soul is more perfect, nevertheless its superiority does not consist in dominion over its activities, but in the fact that the soul is the principle of activities which living things are able to have in themselves, by which they are able to perfect themselves.¹⁵⁷

14 *Whether to be necessitated to act is sometimes a perfection.*-But there remains this doubt: In what way it could sometimes be a perfection to be able to cease from activity. For activity is the final perfection of a thing; therefore, to be necessitated to act is to be necessitated to exist in the most perfect state; therefore, it is a great perfection. And thus, to be able to be without this state is an imperfection.

In a similar way, to be necessitated to see God is a great perfection.¹⁵⁸

Finally, that God is necessitated to love Himself is a greater perfection than to be able to cease from that activity.¹⁵⁹

This difficulty gives flavor to theology. Thus a brief response to this is that there are certain actualities in things which follow upon the ultimate end of a thing, and to be necessitated to these activities is a perfection, as the argument given proves. And thus there is no freedom concerning the ultimate end perfectly proposed. But there are some activities which, although they bring some perfection, because

¹⁵⁷ In other words only beings with souls are able to act on themselves and to augment their own perfection. Even the souls of plants enable plants to do this since in growing plants perfect themselves.

¹⁵⁸ The blessed souls, having seen God who is the perfect good, cannot fail to see Him because they cannot fail to love Him. This is a perfection because it is in accordance with reason to necessarily love what is objectively most lovable.

¹⁵⁹ Again, this is because God is the most lovable being possible, so it would be an imperfection in God if He could fail to love Himself since that would be to fail to love what is most worthy of love.

they activate a power, nevertheless are not such that any one of them is absolutely necessary for the perfection of the power because it either impedes a nobler power or, certainly, because, although the power lacks one activity, it is able to have another.¹⁶⁰ And concerning these activities indifference and freedom are a much greater good than that which each activity by itself confers on a power.

Note that, although indifference and freedom with respect to activities which do not belong to the ultimate end are more perfect than to be necessitated would be, nevertheless, because of their excessive number, mutability with respect to these activities is not more perfect, but it is better to act freely and immutably. Freely, indeed insofar as loving this or that is concerned, but immutably with respect to that which the choice, having been made once concerning the things which are to be loved, the will perseveres always and immutably in

¹⁶⁰ Suarez thinks, in other worlds, that to be necessitated to perform those acts which are necessary for a thing to achieve its ultimate natural end is a perfection. Thus to be necessitated to love God above all things is a perfection for any rational creature. But, to be necessitated to think of a mathematical equation is not a perfection because to think of a logical inference is an equally perfect actualization of the power of the intellect. Again, to perform activities that would lead one to become a physicist is a perfection, but to perform activities that would lead one to become a philosopher is an equal perfection. This is because, while both of these accord with the rational nature of the human soul, neither is necessary for a human being to achieve human flourishing. Thus, insofar as some acts are not necessary for the achievement of the ultimate end of a thing, to be necessitated to perform them is not a perfection but a limitation.

that love.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, this mode is so perfect that it can belong to God alone.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ For instance, it would not be a perfection to be necessitated to become either a physicist or a philosopher; thus it is a good that a person be able to choose which to become. But having chosen, it is better to immutably love and devote one's self to philosophy, rather than to perpetually waver between engaging in philosophy and other sorts of intellectual activities.

¹⁶² Suarez is here thinking of the doctrine that God is free with respect to creation. Since creatures, unlike God Himself, are not perfectly good, God was able to choose to create or not, and was able to choose to create the creatures He did rather than others. But having created the creatures He did, God immutably, though freely, always loves them and sustains them in being.

Question 3

Whether the soul possesses an essential ordination to an organic body

1 We have said that the soul is first act, but that which is act must necessarily have an ordination towards that which it actualizes. Thus Aristotle¹⁶³ defined the soul through ordination to the body of which it is the act. In chapter 2 of *On the Soul*¹⁶⁴ he concludes that the soul is not a body, but is, nevertheless, "something of a body". From this it seems to be implied that the soul has an essential ordination to a body without which it is neither intelligible nor able to be defined.

2 *Nevertheless there is a difficulty [with this doctrine].*

In the first place because to be [essentially] ordered to something is a relational property; the soul, however, does not intrinsically and essentially include a relation, otherwise it would be an accident.¹⁶⁵

Secondly, either by "body" we understand matter-and that is not right because an essential ordination to matter is common to all forms-or we understand matter with an organic structure, and that is

¹⁶³ *De an.* 412 a 19-22; 412 d 27 f.

¹⁶⁴ *De an.* 414 a 17 ff. Cf. 414 a 20 ff.; 412 a 17 ff.

¹⁶⁵ The argument here is that the soul is a constituent of living substances, but every constituent of a substance gives substantial being, and substantial being is absolute or non-relative being; hence no relation or relational property could be included in the essence of the soul. If, however, the soul were essentially ordered to an organic body, then a relation would be included in its essence.

not right because matter with an organic structure includes the soul.¹⁶⁶ In fact, organic structure is brought about by the soul; otherwise it would be brought about by accidents which is a bigger problem, for in that case the soul would be essentially ordered to accidents.¹⁶⁷

Lastly, the soul is essentially ordered to activity. For it is the first principle of vital activities; therefore, it is not essentially ordered to a body for essential ordination can only be one.

3 This difficulty has an aspect common to all forms and an aspect that is specific to the soul. For, in fact, it is a common difficulty how an absolute entity could be essentially ordered to another entity to which it is adjusted and adapted; under [this difficulty] there is included the difficulty of how an accident could be essentially ordered to a subject, how a power could be essentially ordered to an object, etc.¹⁶⁸ The

¹⁶⁶ The argument here is a dilemma:

1. If the soul were essentially ordered to a body it would either be ordered to matter as such or to matter with an organic structure.
2. It is not essentially ordered to matter as such.
Support: The soul cannot inform just any old matter but only matter that has been appropriately disposed.
3. The soul is not essentially ordered to matter with an organic structure.
Support: Matter with an organic structure is matter that has already been informed by the soul.
4. The soul is not ordered to a body.

¹⁶⁷ This is a response to a possible objection to the argument just considered. For one might deny the support for the third premise of it by insisting that matter as informed by *certain accidents* constitutes an organic body, *not* matter as informed by *the soul*. The response to this is just that then the soul would be ordered to accidents and this is impossible since accidents are for the sake of substances and the soul, as being one of the substantial constituents of a living substance, has a certain type of substantial being.

¹⁶⁸ For Suarez all relations require *relata* and the ultimate *relata* of any relation cannot themselves be relations under pain of an infinite regress. This means that non-relative or absolute entities are the foundation of all relative entities. But it would seem that such non-relative entities could not them-

special difficulty concerning the soul, however, is whether or not the soul should be classified with such things [as an accident or a power]. Concerning the common aspect of this difficulty see what is said in the chapter *On Real Relation*.¹⁶⁹

4 Concerning the difficulty which occupies us, let the first conclusion be: The aptitude that it has for informing the body is of the essence of the soul. Scotus denies this in [his commentary on the *Sentences*], 2, d. 3, q. *ultima*,¹⁷⁰ and in *Quodlibeta* 2,¹⁷¹ but St. Thomas affirms it in [the *Summa theologiae*] 1 p., q. 75, a. 7, ad. 3, and in *Summa contra gentiles*, book 2, chapter 81. [On this see] Cajetan's [commentary on] *De ente et essentia*, qq. 13 and 15.¹⁷²

selves essentially include a relation to some other thing since they would then be relative entities themselves. Nevertheless, it does seem that at least some non-relative entities are essentially related to other things, a color, for instance. A color is an accident that is not itself a relation in the way a cat's *being on a mat* is; however, a color cannot naturally exist without being in a substance and, so, is essentially ordered to a substance.

Suarez's general solution to this problem, stated below in sections 11-12, is to hold that some absolute entities, *in virtue of what they are*, are able to have certain sorts of relations to other absolute entities. As an illustration, consider a cup holding water. The cup is not *its relation* to the water it is holding, nor is it such that it *must be so related* to that water or any other liquid. However, it is such that it is able to hold water and other liquids in the way a ball, for instance, is not. Of course, a cup itself is not a substance according to Suarez, since it is an artifact and no artifact is a substance but is either a set of substances related in a certain way or a single substance *cum* an imposed accident or set of imposed accidents. Nevertheless the example of the cup is apt for illustrating the point, and Suarez himself refers to artifacts in paragraph 12 when he briefly explains it.

¹⁶⁹ MD, XLVII.

¹⁷⁰ = q. 11. Cf. *Commentaria oxoniensia in I et II librum sententiarum*, ed. by M.F. Garcia (Quaracchi, 1912), t. 12, pp. 127-159

¹⁷¹ *J. Duns Scoti opera omnia* (Paris, 1891-95), notes 5 ff: t. 25, pp. 62 ff.

¹⁷² *De ente et essentia* (Lyon, 1558), 318 ff.; 327 f.

Proof of the conclusion: The soul is essentially a form, and a form is essentially informative of matter; therefore [the soul is essentially informative of matter]. The major is clear from [what we said in] question one. The minor is clear from book 1 of the *Physics*, chapter 9, q. 1, ad 4. And it is plain in itself, for form is not made for its own sake but in order to be the act of another thing and thus it is an incomplete entity because it does not exist for its own sake but to complete something else. Therefore, in virtue of its own essence, form demands an aptitude for informing; an aptitude, however, cannot be understood without ordination. Therefore, form has an essential ordination to matter.

Confirmation: The soul is essentially a part. However, every part is essentially ordered to a whole and to other parts. Therefore, [the soul is essentially ordered to a whole and to other parts of that whole].

Additionally, the aptitudinal ordination of an accident to a substance is essential to an accident; therefore, the aptitudinal ordination to matter is essential to a substantial form.¹⁷³

Finally, the essential function of matter is to receive form; therefore the essential function of form is to actualize matter.

Therefore, just as matter is not something other in its essence than an entity apt to receive a form, and thus potency for receiving form is the very being of matter, so form in its essence is not anything other than an entity apt for informing matter,¹⁷⁴ and that aptitude is not

¹⁷³ This seems to be an *a fortiori* argument based on the idea that the soul, as constituting part of the essence of a substance, could not be less ordered to the substance it essentially constitutes than an accident is to the substance it only accidentally does.

¹⁷⁴ What Suarez says here, if taken literally, seems to conflict with his teaching that the human soul is by nature immaterial and immortal (see the next disputation, question 3) as well as with his own definition of substantial form

something accidental added to form, but is itself the essential difference of form.

Therefore, those who think that an aptitude to inform is a property of the soul which follows from its essence are mistaken; for certainly, if this aptitude followed from its essence, it would presuppose an already fully constituted essence of the soul.¹⁷⁵ This, however, is impossible, for it is impossible to conceive of form as complete in the nature of form and not conceive it in its aptitude for informing; therefore it essentially includes this aptitude. See what we have said in a similar passage about the aptitude of prime matter. Because, nevertheless, this aptitude to inform matter is common to all substantial forms, it remains to be seen what uniquely pertains to the soul on this point.

5 Let the second conclusion to this be: The soul is essentially ordered to an organic body, and in this it differs from other forms.

6 By way of explanation it should first be noted that there is a difference between matter and form. For matter is the same in all generable beings; forms, however, are diverse.¹⁷⁶ We have given an explanation

as "a certain simple and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes with it the essence of a composite substance" (MD XV, *On the Formal Cause of Substance*, section V, 1). But, if we interpret him charitably, we can say that he is here asserting, however hyperbolically, that form, *by its nature*, is ordered to informing matter and that this ordering to matter is only conceptually, not really, distinct from the form (see below section 12).

¹⁷⁵ This is based on the notion that, in general, the powers of a composite substance emanate neither from its form nor its matter alone but from the substance constituted by both. The one exception to this concerns the rational soul which emanates the powers of reason and will even when separated from matter.

¹⁷⁶ Matter, since it was posited by the Aristotelian Scholastics as the continuum in all substantial changes, must be the same in its nature in all of them and hence cannot account for the properties that distinguish one sort of gen-

for this in another place.¹⁷⁷ Hence, if matter is taken as bare, all forms of natural things inform matter of the same nature, which is generally said to be remote matter; and in this respect they are not distinguished.

They differ, nevertheless, in two ways.

First they differ in the dispositions which they require in matter so that they can inform matter and be conserved in it.¹⁷⁸ Second, [they differ] in the formal effect they have on matter.¹⁷⁹ And this is the primary and essential difference that exists among forms. From it another [difference] arises, for because form informs matter in such and such a way and bestows such being on the composite, it therefore requires particular dispositions; therefore the essential difference between forms must be taken more from the formal effect than from second and proximate matter which is endowed with actual dispositions; for all these things are the same.¹⁸⁰

erable material substance from another. Thus, only the substantial forms of generable things can account for such properties.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. above, q. 1, section 8.

¹⁷⁸ It is the various dispositions introduced into some portion of matter that determine the sort of substantial form it is able to be informed by; that is why, for example, cats give birth to kittens rather than dogs, and burning a tree produces ashes not diamonds.

¹⁷⁹ The formal effect of a form is simply to actualize the capacity of matter to be the body of a certain sort of substance. Thus different sorts of substantial forms give to matter different sorts of substantial being. See MD, XV, section VII.

¹⁸⁰ This passage reflects the primacy Suarez and the scholastics in general gave to final causes. For, although the accidents that dispose matter for receiving such and such a form are materially prior to that form and, often, temporally prior as well, their final cause is the composite substance itself which is nothing but matter informed by a certain form or, what amounts to the same, form informing a certain matter. Since this is so, and since the final cause gives the most profound answer to the question "why is such and such the case?", Suarez insists that the differences between forms ought to be taken chiefly from their distinct formal effects, i.e. the constitution of differ-

The soul therefore differs in the first place from the forms of inanimate things because it has a more noble effect upon matter, constitutes a more perfect composite, and bestows on it a richer being than other forms do.¹⁸¹

And hence it differs in the second place because the soul requires that matter be disposed in a more eminent way than other forms do.¹⁸²

And both of these differences can be understood in the words of Aristotle: "[The Souls] is the act of an organically structured physical body."¹⁸³

7 For proof of this it should be noted, in the second place, that a body which has parts that differ in nature is said to be organically structured. For an organ is some part which is, as it were, an instrument designed for some kind of activity; and so organic parts are usually called functional or instrumental parts by Aristotle. See book 2 of the *Parts of Animals*,¹⁸⁴ and Galen, book 8 of *De placitis*,¹⁸⁵ and also Hip-

ent sorts of material substances, rather than from the diverse dispositions they require in matter in order to produce such effects.

¹⁸¹ The forms of living beings are nobler than the forms of non-living beings because they give living beings the power to perfect themselves, while the forms of inanimate beings do not. Even plants have the power to perfect themselves since they can grow and repair damage done to them. Furthermore, they continually act to keep themselves in being by actively maintaining those dispositions in matter which make it a suitable receptacle for their forms.

¹⁸² For Suarez this eminence is indicated by the complexity of structure of the bodies of living beings. He would have welcomed contemporary genetics as further confirmation of the complexity of the dispositions living beings require in matter.

¹⁸³ That form is the *act* of an organically structured physical body refers to its effect on matter, that it is the act of an *organically structured* physical body refers to the complexity of the dispositions it requires in matter to inform it.

¹⁸⁴ 647 a 2-5.

¹⁸⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1 cl., folio 275 B.

pocrates¹⁸⁶ and Plato.¹⁸⁷ Commonly speaking, however, organic parts and dissimilar parts are the same, as St. Thomas noted in *Disputed Questions on the Soul*, a. 15, ad. 3,¹⁸⁸ and it is characteristic of the soul to be the act of a body that consists of parts of this type. But other forms inform a body of the same nature in all of its parts, but every soul informs a body that has parts that differ from one another, as is obvious from induction.

The reason [for this difference] is that, since the soul is a more perfect form than the forms of inanimate things, it surpasses these forms in operations since the form of an inanimate thing has one simple and natural mode of operating without skill and variety; but the soul has a great diversity in its works, and executes its actions in a certain skillful and admirable way, and therefore it requires diverse organs, the more numerous and nobler the more perfect the soul is.¹⁸⁹ The philosopher makes excellent observations on this in *The Parts of Animals*, book 2, chapter 10;¹⁹⁰ [as does] Albert the Great in [his commentary] *On the Soul*, book 2, tract 1, chapter 3.¹⁹¹

But someone will object that the heaven has an organic body and nevertheless its form is not a soul.¹⁹² I reply that the diversity of the parts of the heaven does not constitute a true organic body in the

¹⁸⁶ Not found.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *Tim.* 45 a.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. *op. cit.*, a. 8, ad 14; a. 9; a. 9, ad 14; a. 10, ad 1; a. 2, ad 17.

¹⁸⁹ The primacy of the final over the material, efficient, and even formal cause, is apparent in this passage.

¹⁹⁰ 656 a 3-7.

¹⁹¹ *Op. cit.*, t. 5, pp. 195 ff.

¹⁹² The "heaven" here is equivalent to what we would call outer space, not to the realm of the blessed. The Schoolmen held that pure spirits were responsible for the motions of the planets. Suarez did not consider these spirits souls since they are not ordered to informing matter in order to constitute with it a single living substance. Thus the relationship they have to the planets they move is analogous to that a pilot has to his ship.

strict sense because it is only according to a greater or lesser density. Perhaps the stars are not proper parts of the heaven but bodies of a sort included in it, as one can see in the stars which have epicycles. There is, therefore, a difference between the soul and other forms because the soul informs an organic body and others do not.

8 But note, in the third place, in heterogeneous parts two things are to be considered. First there is diversity of accidental dispositions in which they differ, for example in shape, density, heat, etc. Second there is diversity in the mode of the informing of the substantial form, for just as its parts differ in their dispositions and are ordered towards different functions, so also they are seen to differ in substantial being, which is conferred on them by the form, whether that is on account of the diversity of partial substantial forms or on account of the diverse manner of informing of the same [substantial] form.¹⁹³

For just as the soul of a plant, through its diverse parts, also constitutes distinct organic parts, so the whole human soul existing in each part informs them in diverse ways.¹⁹⁴ This can be understood as follows: because from the power of the mode by which the soul informs the head it requires in it certain sorts of dispositions, and, if some one of them is diminished, the soul immediately departs from it.

¹⁹³ Suarez, unlike St. Thomas and his school, held that there are distinct partial "substantial" forms corresponding to the distinct parts of a tree, for instance the roots, trunk, branches, etc. In addition to these partial substantial forms he held that the tree itself has a tree form, which is, as it were, constituted out of all those partial forms. It seems difficult, on this doctrine, to account for the substantial unity of a tree.

¹⁹⁴ The soul of a human being emanates in the composite distinct powers. These powers should not be equated with the physical structure in which they reside. Thus the power of sight should not be equated with the eyes, or the eyes plus certain nerves and parts of the brain, etc. Nevertheless the power of sight requires certain dispositions in the matter it informs (e.g. it requires those dispositions that make up human eyes). Since that is so, any soul which is the root of such a power, also requires such dispositions in the organic body it informs, at least in order to most perfectly inform it.

It does not require those dispositions in the foot according to the manner by which it informs it nor would those dispositions flow from its power into another member of the body.¹⁹⁵

From what has been said one can gather that organic structure, although it can be explained and more easily understood by its accidents, nevertheless truly consists in the very substance of the thing, when the information of the substantial form is taken into account.¹⁹⁶

Hence two kinds of organic structure can be distinguished: One, being accidental and consisting in a diversity of accidents, the other being substantial and consisting in the mode of informing of the soul.

Similarly, "organic body" can be understood in two ways:

In one way it can be taken to be matter disposed for receiving the soul, for just as the form of fire requires matter properly disposed, so also does the soul. However, there is a difference because the form of fire requires dispositions of the same nature, but the soul requires diverse dispositions in diverse parts, according to the different func-

¹⁹⁵ Some parts of the body are necessary for the soul to inform the body at all, while others are not. If the parts of the body necessary for the soul to inform the body are destroyed, then the soul can no longer inform the body. Thus the soul informs different parts of the body in different ways not only in the sense that it emanates different powers in those different parts (e.g. it emanates different powers in the head than it does in the feet), but also precisely in the sense that its information of some parts of the body is necessary for its information of the body as a whole (e.g. its information of the head is necessary for its information of the body as a whole and so also for its information of the feet, but the converse is not true).

¹⁹⁶ This is to say that the parts of a living thing are parts of a living thing, not precisely in virtue of their physical structures and other accidental properties, but in virtue of the way the soul informs them. This can best be understood by reference to final causality, i.e. by reference to the function the parts of a living thing play in the life of the living thing as a whole.

tions the parts are ordered to. This difference follows from another difference, namely that the form of fire, for example, does not bestow on the composite a grade of being above the corporeal sphere; but the soul surpasses it and confers the perfection of life. And so the soul is said to suppose the body as its receptacle, not because a determinate body would be constituted by another [substantial] form besides the soul,¹⁹⁷ but because the soul itself, insofar as it confers the perfection of life, presupposes the perfection of the body brought together by the soul itself according to diverse aspects, as we have noted [in our commentary on] *On Generation and Corruption*, book 1. [On this see also] St. Thomas, [*Summa theologiae*], 1 p., q. 76,¹⁹⁸ and *On Spiritual Creatures*, a. 3, ad. 2, and *Disputed Questions Concerning the Soul*, a. 9. Giles of Rome¹⁹⁹ notes it in [his commentary on this passage], as does Cajetan in [his commentary on the same passage]²⁰⁰ and in [his commentary on] *De ente et essentia*, chapter 7.²⁰¹

Therefore, in this sense "organic body" signifies matter informed by form as giving being that is corporeal and disposed organically according to its diverse parts. And if "body" is taken this way in the definition, it signifies the subject of the soul with whatever would be required so that it would be subjected to the soul. Such a body is said to be in potency to life, that is, to a form conferring the substantial being of a living thing. And "to be in potency" is taken there, not as signifying a privation, but as signifying the potency to receive an

¹⁹⁷ In other words an organic body is not one substance at all without the information of it by the soul and so the body of a human or an animal does not have any organic form distinct from the soul itself. According to this doctrine a corpse is not the same as the body of the organism which died, but is either a new substance that came to be at the moment of the organism's death, or is an accidental unity consisting of a number of substances joined together.

¹⁹⁸ *passim*

¹⁹⁹ Cf. below Question 4, note 257.

²⁰⁰ Cf. below Question 4, note 263.

²⁰¹ *Op.cit.*, p. 326.

act, although [the potency] would be under [the dominion of act].²⁰² "To be in potency" can be taken in both ways,²⁰³ as has been said in book 1 of the *Physics*.

"Organic body" can be taken in another way because of its substantial organization, and in this way it signifies the same thing as a composite of matter and substantial form informing the different parts of the matter in different ways.²⁰⁴ This form is nothing else but the soul, and such an organic body is the living being itself constituted by a soul. And "organic body" in this sense differs from the first sense because the former is formally, organically structured by its accidents, but the latter is formally, organically structured by the soul. Hence the former is placed in the genus of material cause for the re-

²⁰² In other words, the body spoken of here is the body of a living being. Such a body is not in potency to being alive in the way that something that could be, but is not yet, is, but only in the way something currently receiving the perfection of life is. This might seem absurd, for one might think that if a body is receiving life then it is *not* in potency to it. But the point is simply this—that a living body is made *formally* to be alive by the soul and so its life, at every moment, *depends on the soul's information of it*. This being so, a living body does not have life of itself, if we consider it in distinction from the soul. Nevertheless, it continues to *receive* life *from* the soul as long as it continues to possess those dispositions necessary for the soul to inform it.

²⁰³ That is to say that "organic body" can be taken to refer to that which can be actualized in some way but is not yet so actualized, or it can be taken to refer to that which is already actualized and which continually receives its actualization from the soul. Water that is not boiling but could boil is in potency in the first way, while water that is boiling due to the continual action on it of a source of heat is in potency in the second way.

²⁰⁴ In the first sense "organic body" is taken to refer to the body of a living being taken as a living body *in virtue of the form which informs it*, but not as *including* in itself that form. In the second sense "organic body" refers, not just to the body of a living being as informed by the soul, but to the living being itself, including both the body and the soul. Consider this analogy. We might speak of "the water that is hot", considering the water itself, neither as separated from its heat nor as including it, but as the entity possessing it, or we might speak of "the *hot water*" taken as referring to the composite of the water and its heat.

ceiving of the soul, but the latter is constituted by the power of the introduction of the soul.

In Aristotle's definition of the soul²⁰⁵ "organic body" can also be understood in this second way; and thus it explains the quiddity of the soul very well, for it states the proper mode of the soul's informing, through which it is distinguished from other forms, and by reason of which the soul requires accidental organic structure in matter. If "organic body" is taken in this way, it is said of it that it has life in potency, not in the sense of substantial but accidental life, that is, in potency to vital powers.²⁰⁶

9 But perhaps you will say that in neither way can the soul possess ordination to an organic body since in the first way an organic body includes accidents; however, substance, since it is prior to and more perfect than accidents, is not able to have an ordination to them, nor is it able to be defined through them.²⁰⁷ But, indeed, in the second way an organic body is the same as the living thing, which is posterior to

²⁰⁵ *De an.* 412 b 5 f.

²⁰⁶ Taken in the first way, the organic body, while not being considered as without life, is considered as that which *receives* life formally from the soul and is able to in virtue of its dispositions. Thus, though the body is not here considered as lacking life, it is considered as receiving substantial life and as being able to in virtue of its accidental dispositions. Taken in the second way, the organic body is considered along with the life it receives from the soul by way of information. Taken in this sense the body is not in any way in potency to substantial life (since it is here considered not as that which receives life but as something which possess it), but to accidental life, that is to vital activities (e.g. eating, growing, thinking, etc.)

²⁰⁷ The idea behind this objection is that the less perfect exists for the sake of the more perfect and can be understood and defined by its relation to the more perfect. Thus accidents exist for the sake of substances and can be understood by their relation to substances. If, however, the soul is defined as the act of matter possessing certain sorts of accidents, then something in the substantial order will be defined through its relation to accidents rather than the converse.

the soul and includes it. Therefore, the soul cannot have ordination to the living thing nor be defined through it.²⁰⁸ Otherwise, it would be defined through something posterior and, in a certain way, through itself.

With respect to the first argument some respond that an organic body taken in the first way does not include accidents intrinsically, but it includes them in a certain extrinsic way. This is the response of those who deny that accidents inhere in prime matter.²⁰⁹

But I do not see how matter can be disposed unless it intrinsically includes dispositions, or in what way accidents can dispose matter except formally and by inhering in matter.²¹⁰ Hence, I concede that

²⁰⁸ In other words, if the organic body is not understood as matter plus certain accidents, but rather as something actualized and intrinsically vivified by the soul, then to define the soul as the act of an organic body is to define it by reference to a whole which includes it. But this is, in a way, tantamount to defining it by reference to itself, which flouts one of the cardinal rules of a good definition.

²⁰⁹ The Thomists held that prime matter, being a pure potency, could not, of itself, support accidents-only prime matter that has already been actualized by a substantial form could. In accordance with this doctrine they denied that the dispositional accidents introduced into some substance A could be numerically the same as any accidents inhering in some substance B that came to be in the matter which once was a partial constituent of A. Suarez disagreed with this since he did not see how any accidents in A could indispose the matter in A for A's form and dispose it for the reception of a different form, B, unless those accidents could inhere in matter itself. If fire, for example, renders the matter of a tree unfit for the continued information of a tree form by introducing in the matter of the tree accidental dispositions that are hostile to such a form, and, in so doing, renders the matter of the tree fit for the information of the form of ash, then at least some of the accidents introduced into the matter of the tree that dispose it for receiving the form of ash must remain in the matter. All this further entails that matter itself has enough actuality to sustain accidents on its own since matter is the only entity in the substantial order that is common to the tree and the ash, and only it could, as it were, transfer accidents from the tree to the ash.

²¹⁰ See the immediately preceding note for an explanation of this.

an organic body understood in the first way includes accidents. Nevertheless, the soul can be defined with reference to such a body because accidents of that sort are prior to the soul itself in the genus of material causality, although they are posterior in perfection; for, although the order of substance is absolutely prior to the order of accidents, even in the genus of material causality, nevertheless some accidents, with reference to a certain partial substance,²¹¹ can be prior in some genus of causality.

But it must not be thought because of this that the soul is ordered to accidents; rather is it the case that the accidents themselves are ordered to the soul by preparing a subject in which it ought to be received. And in this way [accidents] can enter into the definition [of the soul].

To the second argument,²¹² I respond that the composite is indeed posterior to the form in the order of execution; nevertheless, it is prior in the order of intention and final cause because the soul has an intrinsic ordination to constituting the composite.²¹³ Thus also the

²¹¹ In this case the partial substance is a substantial form. Suarez thinks that substantial forms in some way depend on accidents in the order of material causality. This is just to say they depend on certain accidents to make matter a fit receptacle for them. Thus the form of a living being, for instance, could not naturally inform matter having the accidental dispositions of a slab of marble.

²¹² I.e. to the objection to the definition of the soul as the act of an organic body that takes "organic body" to refer to a body actualized by substantial form and thus takes it to refer to the living being itself constituted by both the body and the soul.

²¹³ The form is ontologically prior to the composite it partially constitutes according to Suarez since he held that the form must first exist in order to exercise its causality. This does not mean that the form is always temporally prior either to the exercise of its causality or to the composite it partially constitutes. But, though the form is ontologically prior to the composite insofar as the composite is partially constituted by it, the composite is prior to the form in the order of final causality since the form exists for the sake of the

act of informing is posterior in execution but nevertheless is prior in final causation.²¹⁴ This is the way act is always related to potency. And thus as potency is best defined through act, so also the soul is best defined through its formal act, which is the constitution of a certain sort of composite [i.e. a living organism].²¹⁵ This type of definition is common in Aristotle.²¹⁶ For he defines quality as that by which things are said to be such and such.²¹⁷ And below, in text 73,²¹⁸ he defines light as the act of the diaphanous in act; nevertheless, he holds that the diaphanous becomes such through light. It is not true that the thing to be defined enters into the definition, although something enters into it in which the thing to be defined is implicitly contained.²¹⁹ This is not a defect in the case of those things which are defined through an addition.²²⁰ From all of these arguments the truth of the

composite it partially constitutes. For this reason, it is not improper to define any form, including the soul, through the composite it is ordered to, even if, in some sense, the form is prior to the composite.

²¹⁴ Just as the form is prior ontologically to the composite, so also it is prior ontologically to its causality which is to inform matter. But, again, the form's informing of matter is prior in the order of final causality to the form itself since the form exists in order to constitute the composite by informing matter.

²¹⁵ For Suarez the causality of any form consists in its union with an appropriately disposed matter. This union is really distinct from the form itself though not from its constitution of the sort of whole it is ordered to partially constituting.

²¹⁶ *De an.* 412 a 9 f.; 19 f.; 27 f.; b 5 f.; b 27-413 a; b 3.

²¹⁷ According to Suarez, Aristotle's definition of quality defines quality through its formal effect which is just to make a certain substance to be of such and such a sort (e.g. red, round, honest, smart, etc.).

²¹⁸ *De an.*, 418 b 9 f.; 419 a 11.

²¹⁹ Since the causality of a form, i.e. its union with an appropriately disposed matter, is really distinct from any form according to Suarez, defining a form through its causality is *not* defining it through itself. However, since the causality of a form is dependent on that form, any definition of a form in terms of its causality implicitly refers to the form itself.

²²⁰ Such a definition is by reference to a whole that an entity partially constitutes. Suarez calls this sort of definition a "definition by addition" since it

second conclusion [i.e. the soul is essentially ordered to an organic body] is obvious.

10 But you will ask whether the soul has ordination to the organic body understood either as the whole or the disposed mater. It must be said, following Book 1 of the *Physics*, that ordination to a composite and to matter is one and the same thing. And thus the problem is solved because the soul, by the same act, informs matter and constitutes the composite, and thus the aptitude for both is one and the same thing, although it is conceptually distinguished by us. The soul, however, is not ordered to disposed matter in the same way as it is ordered to the accidents themselves, but it is ordered to the matter which it informs. Accidents as prerequisites [for the information of the soul] are necessary conditions. But whether Aristotle in his definition takes "organic body" to mean material dispositions or the composite will be treated with greater propriety in the following question.²²¹

11 *Solution to the difficulties raised above.*²²²---To the first difficulty²²³ the usual response is that the ordination of the soul to the body, as well as similar ordinations, is a transcendental relation, not a predicamental one. These two types of relations are distinguished because the predicamental relation is a special genus of being, but a transcendental relation is found in many different genera. This distinction has always displeased me, unless by chance it is a purely verbal question and any ordination or habitude whatsoever is called a re-

proceeds by a consideration of what the entity to be defined *adds* to the other constitutes of a whole in order to do its part in constituting the whole. It should be noted that the composite in question could be a substantial whole (e.g. a living being) or an accidental whole (e.g. a pale man).

²²¹ See section 6 of the following question.

²²² These difficulties were discussed in section 2. They are both directed at supposing that one could define the soul as possessing an essential ordination to a body. For a brief discussion of them, see notes 165 and 166 above.

²²³ This difficulty is that the soul, being substantial, cannot be defined or intrinsically constituted by a relational property.

lation. This is improper, for a relation is said only of that entity the being of which formally consists in respect to another, and every entity which is such is truly a predicamental relation because the definition of the first genus of this category belongs to it. An entity that is not of this sort is not a relation.

The response to this problem is thus in conformity with things set forth at the beginning of the chapter *On Real Relations*,²²⁴ that there are certain things that are wholly absolute which are said to take their species through an aptitude to something to which they are ordained, not as to a terminus, but as to an intrinsic end on account of which they were made. This order is not a relation because it does not posit in such a thing formal dependence on that to which it is ordained, as is obvious, since the soul is able to endure although the body has been corrupted. [The same occurs with] a power although its object has been destroyed, and with knowledge although nothing knowable exists. This is an obvious sign that these are not relations, but things ordered to a proper end. Such an ordination pertains to the essence of a thing because by its nature this thing receives a determinate essence, so that, through it, it is apt towards some end. This aptitude is absolute and intrinsic to the thing itself.

12 Consequently it must be said of the soul that by its own nature it is ordained to informing a body, and for this reason it receives an essence according to which it is suited for this end. All that which it receives is of an absolute character although it is suited and ordained to constitute something else. Artifacts best illustrate this point, as we said in the place cited. It can be explained further, for it is one thing for a thing to be suited to another and something else for it to be referred to it; for to be suited posits an absolute entity in the thing itself. And if every other extrinsic thing is excluded, it is an internal property of the thing itself to remain intrinsically suited, although this suitability

²²⁴ I.e. *MD*, XLVII.

ity could not be explained except through that to which it is suited and to which it is ordained as an end. It is otherwise, however, concerning a relation, for it can neither exist nor be understood without its terminus. Therefore, not every thing which is defined and explained through another should be considered relative, nor indeed should it be thought that everything absolute can be defined without reference to another, as Scotus²²⁵ thought in the passage cited above. Apollinar thought the same in text 6, q. 3²²⁶ of [his commentary on *On the Soul*] saying that the soul can be defined without ordination to another thing, for that property is not only proper to relative things but also to absolute things which are imperfect and are by their nature a part of another thing. Moreover it also happens that a very perfect thing cannot be comprehended unless an aptitude to something extrinsic is conceived in it, as the omnipotence of God cannot be comprehended without knowledge of all the possible creatures in which it could be manifested.

²²⁵ Cf. notes 170 and 171 above.

²²⁶ *Expositio...in libros De anima* (Venice, 1496), II 3, 2 folios 16 f.

Question 4

What the quidditative²²⁷ definition of the soul is
and how one definition is proven through another

1 We presented above two definitions of the soul taken from Aristotle.²²⁸ Now we must see which of them is quidditative and how one can be proven through the other. Both involve a difficulty since both are stated by means of certain extrinsic factors²²⁹ such as the body and its activities. Neither is therefore quidditative.

In addition, the first contains many superfluous elements for there is no organic body that is not physical, and by the very fact that it is organic, it has life potentially. Hence the qualifiers "physical" etc. are superfluous.

2 The second definition is also deficient in many ways:

In the first place, it is not applicable to every soul but only to the intellective because it alone is the principle of living, sensing, and

²²⁷ A quidditative definition of something is a real definition of a thing which does not refer simply to certain accidents of it nor to the way it affects other things, but to what it is in itself. For the Scholastics such a definition will refer to the genus the thing is in and the specific differences that essentially distinguish it from all other things in that genus.

²²⁸ I.e. that the soul is the first act of a physical organic body that is potentially alive (*De an.* 412 a 27 f.) and that the soul is the first principle by which we live, sense, and understand (*De an.* 414 a 12 ff.).

²²⁹ The idea is that a true quidditative definition should not refer to the way a thing is related to other things, nor, indeed, to any accidental feature of it.

understanding.²³⁰ Again, it is applicable to God since He is the first principle of life in all things.²³¹ Hence Aristotle in Book 1 of *On Plants*²³² says that the principle of life in living things is the moving, living thing that turns the sky, the stars, and the planets.

Then also, one definition destroys the other since just as one thing has one essence so it can have only one essential definition.²³³ Therefore as long as several are given, all are rendered suspect.

Finally, that which something is [i.e. its quiddity] cannot be demonstrated; according to book 2 of the *Posterior Analytics*.²³⁴ Therefore the proof of one definition by another cannot be reliable.²³⁵

3 Note that in every natural thing there are two aspects, namely being and activity. Activity flows from being; nevertheless being exists for activity although activity itself takes place because of the perfection of

²³⁰ According to this criticism of the second definition it is *too narrow* since it does not apply to every soul. A good definition, however, should apply to everything to which the concept to be defined properly applies. Thus to include "brown" in the definition of "cow" would produce a faulty definition of "cow" since there are some cows that are not brown.

²³¹ According to this criticism of the second definition it is *too broad* since it applies to God himself, who is not a soul since He does not inform a body.

²³² 816 a 22 ff.

²³³ A good definition is in terms of genus and specific difference or differences. Hence a good definition captures the essence of a thing and since a thing cannot naturally have more than one essence so, also, it cannot naturally have more than one quidditative definition. It should be apparent from this that for Suarez and the Schoolmen generally, giving necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing's being such and such is *not* sufficient for giving a good definition of a thing.

²³⁴ 90 b 18-91 a 11.

²³⁵ The idea is this: The definition captures the essence of a thing, and we should use the definition to prove all the essential features of the thing not contained in the definition. But, since the definition is the first principle of all demonstration concerning a thing, it cannot be demonstrated any more than self-evident principles can. But this entails we cannot use one definition of a thing to demonstrate another definition of it.

that which is. The origin, however, of both is the constitutive form of the natural thing since it gives specific being to the thing, and it also is the first principle of activity. Thus it can be defined by both aspects, but not in the same way, as I shall indicate immediately.

4 *First conclusion*: The first definition is adequate²³⁶ and is quidditative.

The first part is obvious from what has been said in the preceding three questions since the soul is essentially a form and a first act, and in this respect is similar to other kinds of first act. "First act" thus rightly holds the place of genus since the soul is the act not of an artificial body but of a natural one. There are indeed artificial bodies that are seen to have their own organ-like parts, and thus it is necessary to exclude them. "Organic" is added to distinguish it from inanimate bodies. The clause "which has life in potency" means the same as the other, namely, "organic body," and is therefore added simply for greater clarity. This can be gathered from Aristotle, text 7,²³⁷ from St. Thomas' [commentary on it],²³⁸ from Themistius, commentary 7,²³⁹ and from Philoponus, commentary 1.²⁴⁰ This is true if "organic body" is taken to mean disposed matter, and "potency towards life" is taken to mean substantial life. If, however, "organic body" is taken for the composite [substance] and "potency towards life" for vital activity, the two are different, as Simplicius²⁴¹ noted,

²³⁶ The Latin term here *optima* literally means "best", but that cannot be Suarez's meaning since he later also calls the second definition "optima" (though he denies that it is quidditative, unlike the first definition). He can thus only mean by "optima" something like "adequate", where an adequate definition, even if not quidditative, would neither be too broad nor too narrow.

²³⁷ *De an.* 412 a 18 ff.; a 27 f.; b 5 f.

²³⁸ *De an.* II, lect. 1, notes 230-233.

²³⁹ *De an., op. cit.*, II 6.

²⁴⁰ *De an.* II, *Aristotelis de anima libri tres...* (Lyon, 1544) folios [33] f. Cf. folios [35] col. 1.

²⁴¹ *De an.* II 6, *In libros de anima Aristotelis...* (Venice, 1543) folio xl.

because it is one thing to compose a composite [substance] and give being to it and another thing to give it "power to act."²⁴² Nevertheless, even in this sense the phrase "potency towards life" does not belong essentially to this definition, but it is simply added to explain *a posteriori* what an organic body is.²⁴³ Thus the definition locates the soul in its proper genus and confers on it its proper difference.²⁴⁴ Therefore it lacks nothing that [a good definition should have].

5 The second part of the conclusion is directed against Avicenna, book 6, chapter 1 of *Naturalium*²⁴⁵ where he says this definition does not explain the essence of the soul. Cajetan²⁴⁶ also in this context insinuates that, if in the definition "organic body" is taken to mean disposed matter, it is quidditative, but if it is taken for the substantially organized composite itself, it is not quidditative, but it describes the essence of the soul by something posterior.²⁴⁷

²⁴² This supposes that the vital powers of living things are predicamental accidents and so not part of a thing's very essence. Since they are not part of a thing's essence they cannot figure in its definition. This would seem to make it impossible, however, for a human being to give a quidditative definition of any thing since we come to know the powers of a thing by observing its actions and come to know its essence based on the sorts of powers it has.

²⁴³ That is, to explain what an organic body is by noting its effects, viz. vital activities, is not to explain what it is intrinsically taken as the *root* of its vital activities.

²⁴⁴ The genus is "first act" (i.e. substantial form), the difference is "of a body which is potentially alive", i.e. able to be actualized by the right sort of substantial form.

²⁴⁵ *De an.* I 1 (Venice, 1508), folios 1 ff.

²⁴⁶ *De an.* II 1, n. 32, *op. cit.*, t. II, p 33.

²⁴⁷ That is, the composite consisting of the soul and an appropriately disposed matter is partially composed by the soul and so any definition of the soul which refers to that composite is not property quidditative, but makes reference to something the soul causes. As such it is *a posteriori*, i.e. explains a cause in virtue of its effects.

I say, nevertheless, that the definition is quidditative [taken] in both senses for, as we have said,²⁴⁸ aptitude and ordination for a composite and for matter are the same thing and thus, if the phrase is understood in both senses, it explains the proper essence of the soul. Moreover when the phrase is understood in one sense it virtually includes the other for, if matter has such dispositions it is because of the form that so informs it and because form so informs it, it demands such dispositions.²⁴⁹ Therefore whether "organic body" is taken in one way or the other, the definition is quidditative. Moreover, if a comparison must be made, the definition is more proper if "organic body" is taken according to substantial organization since it explains the proper formal effect of the soul in the order in which it takes its species. If, on the other hand, it were understood as disposed matter, it would not explain so properly the formal effect of the soul itself except perhaps dialectically.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸ Cf. above, q. 3, section 10.

²⁴⁹ The idea is that, in the order of material causality, the physical structure of a living being is prior to its information by the form, but in the order of final causality the living being has such a physical structure in order to be the appropriate receptacle for such a form. Thus the actual physical structure of a living being (i.e. eyes, ears, lungs, liver, heart, etc.) cannot be understood without reference to their function in the living organism itself, and this function cannot be understood without reference to the form of the entire organism, which form is its soul.

²⁵⁰ For Aristotle and his medieval followers a demonstration proceeds from what is prior in itself (i.e. first causes) and moves to what is posterior in itself (i.e. effects). On the other hand, a dialectical argument starts from what is prior or better known to us (i.e. effects) and moves to what is posterior or less well known to us (i.e. first causes).

6 From all of this I gather that what Aristotle means by "organic body" in the definition is the composite [substance] itself organized with substantial organization.²⁵¹

This is what St. Thomas holds in [his commentary on *On the Soul*], text 10²⁵² and in [the *Summa theologiae*] 1 p. q. 76, a. 4, ad I and in Book 7 of [his commentary on] the *Metaphysics*, lecture 10.²⁵³ Themistius holds the same in [his commentary on *On the Soul*], Chapter 7.²⁵⁴ Also Simplicius²⁵⁵ and Albert in [their commentaries], Chapter 3,²⁵⁶ Giles of Rome,²⁵⁷ Apollinar²⁵⁸ and other moderns. Aristotle supports these interpretations when he distinguishes natural bodies into living and non-living. He states that living bodies are composite substances, and he concludes that the soul is their act. The same follows from texts 3, 10 and 25.²⁵⁹ In addition [he supports these interpretations] by saying²⁶⁰ that an organic body has life in potency where by the noun "life" he understands vital activity, as is clear from the context. Finally, [these interpretations are corroborated since] the phrase taken in this sense better explains the quiddity of the soul, as has been said.

The opposite interpretation, [that "organic body"] means disposed matter, is held by Avicenna in Book 3 of the *Metaphysics*, chap-

²⁵¹ I.e. not only as having the appropriate physical structures but as having a soul that can give substantial being to the thing and actualize the powers that are only potentially in those structures without the soul.

²⁵² *De an.* II, lect 2, notes 240 ff.

²⁵³ notes 1484 ff.

²⁵⁴ *De an.* II 7, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

²⁵⁵ *De an.* II 4, *op. cit.*, folio xxxvii.

²⁵⁶ *De an.* II 1, 3, *op. cit.*, t. 5, pp. 197 f.

²⁵⁷ *De an.* II 10, *op. cit.*, folio 24, col. 1.

²⁵⁸ *De an.* II 3, 2, *op. cit.*, folio 17 f.

²⁵⁹ [tx. 3] = *De an.* B 1: 412 a 13-21. [tx 10] = 412 b 25 f. [tx 25] = B 2: 414 a 15-21.

²⁶⁰ *De an.* B 1: 412 a 20 f.; a 28.

ter 3.²⁶¹ Philoponus also holds this opinion in [his commentary on *On the Soul*], commentary 1,²⁶² as do both Cajetans²⁶³ and Soto, in Book 3 of [his commentary on] the *Physics*, q. 1 ad 3.²⁶⁴ St. Thomas hints at this in *On Spiritual Creatures*, a. 3 ad 2. Also Aristotle,²⁶⁵ in this passage, when he says that a whole results from the union of body and soul, is talking about a body that is part of the composite. Further on he says²⁶⁶ that acts are received in a subject that is properly disposed. From this he concludes that a soul is the act of an organic body.

Therefore this interpretation is probable, and, perhaps because the phrase embraces both real aspects, it expresses the same thing now in this way, now in the other way.

7 Second conclusion: This definition applies properly and univocally to every soul.

[This conclusion] is opposed to that of Philoponus in the "Introduction" [of his commentary on *On the Soul*], Book 2,²⁶⁷ by Averroes, in [his commentary on *On the Soul*], commentary 7,²⁶⁸ Alexander in the beginning of [his commentary on] *De sensu et sensibili*,²⁶⁹ Albert, in [his commentary on this passage], Chapter 5,²⁷⁰ and Jand-

²⁶¹ Cf. *Met.* V 3, *op. cit.*, folio 88. Cf. *Met.* III 4, *op. cit.*, folio 77, col. 1.

²⁶² *De an.* II: *op. cit.*, folios [33] f.

²⁶³ Thomas De Vio, *De an.* II, comm.. VII: *op. cit.*, folio 14, col. 1 f. (*Responsio patet intelligenti*). Cajetanus de Thiens, *Super libros de anima* (Venice, 1493) II 1, notes 31 f.

²⁶⁴ *Super octo libros physicorum Aristotelis quaestiones* (Salamanca, 1557), folios 47 f.

²⁶⁵ *De an.* B 1: 412 b 6.

²⁶⁶ 412 b 11.

²⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*, folio [33], col 1.

²⁶⁸ I 7: *op. cit.*, 11, 26-34.

²⁶⁹ *Opusculum...de sensibus...* (Venice, 1544) I 5 f.

²⁷⁰ *De an.* II, tract. 1, chap. 5.

unus, q. 3.²⁷¹ All of these assert that the definition is an analogy and does not apply properly to every soul.

The mind of Aristotle, however, is clearly contrary. Indeed in the beginning of this book²⁷² he states that one must investigate what is above all the general nature of the soul and later he concludes: "If we must state something that is common about every soul, it is that it is the act, etc."²⁷³ And then he says "We have stated in a universal way what the soul is."²⁷⁴ The same thing is implied in Chapter 2²⁷⁵ where he says that, as in all geometrical figures there is one common essence and one definition of the figure in common, so also [with respect to all souls there is one common essence and one definition of soul in common]. Hence here he answers the question which he had proposed in the "Introduction" [to *On the Soul*],²⁷⁶ [namely], whether there is one common essence of the soul.

Again [the reason] is clear: "Soul" expresses one common and univocal concept; therefore its quidditative definition will be univocal. The consequence is self-evident.²⁷⁷ The antecedent is proven,²⁷⁸ first because in this case no trace of an analogy can be imagined, and secondly because "animate" is univocal with respect to all living things. Therefore "soul" [is also univocal] with respect to all living things.

²⁷¹ Not found.

²⁷² *De an.* 412 a 5 f.

²⁷³ *De an.* 412 b 4 ff.

²⁷⁴ *De an.* 412 b 10.

²⁷⁵ *De an.* 413 a 17-20. Cf. *ibid.* c. 3: 414 b 20 ff.

²⁷⁶ *De an.*, 402 b 5 f. What Suarez calls the "Introduction" to *On the Soul* simply consists of the first few sections of book I of it where Aristotle points to the fundamental questions that must be investigated in the study of the soul.

²⁷⁷ Suarez means that the following hypothetical proposition is self-evident: "If 'soul' expresses one common and univocal concept, the quidditative definition of 'soul' is univocal."

²⁷⁸ The antecedent is just that "'soul' does express on common and univocal concept."

Again substantial form is predicated univocally of all substantial forms; therefore ["soul" is predicated univocally of all living beings]. On this see Sylvester of Ferrara's [commentary on] the *Summa contra gentiles*, Book 2, chapter 61.²⁷⁹

8 It is true that, if someone applies the word "soul" to something which does not have a proper soul, for example the intelligence of the heaven, the definition does not apply univocally to it, and that's the way it should be because that [intelligence] is neither univocally nor properly a soul.²⁸⁰

Those authors cited above, however, are mistaken when they think that according to Aristotle it is a fact that something can be properly a soul and not be properly an informing act.²⁸¹ This is false as is clear from question 1 and will be more abundantly clear in the following disputation in Question 4.

Since, therefore, this is the only quidditative definition of soul, it applies univocally to everything that is properly a soul. Hence, if this definition does not apply to something, that thing is not a soul.

²⁷⁹ (Rome, 1897-1898), t. 2, p. 281.

²⁸⁰ Suarez is here referring to those separated intelligences that the Schoolmen held move heavenly bodies. These are not souls because they are substances in their own right and do not, along with matter, constitute a composite substance.

²⁸¹ That is, Suarez thinks that according to Aristotle every soul is a kind of substantial form that is ordered to informing matter so as to compose a single substance with the matter. On this view, then, the angels would not be souls nor would they have souls since they are "subsistent forms" that are complete in themselves, without informing any body. Suarez apparently thinks that Philoponus, Averroes, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, and Jandunus, all hold that non-informing acts (i.e. angels) can be properly held to be souls.

9 Third conclusion: The second definition of Aristotle is also adequate,²⁸² but it is not formally quidditative.

10 In order to prove [the conclusion], it should be noted in the first place that each thing acts by virtue of that through which it is in act since everything that acts, acts insofar as it is in act, and therefore to act and to be arise from the same principle. I say "to act" because it indicates an activity since, as the principle of activity is the form that truly informs, it is necessary that the action proceed from the supposite²⁸³ itself as from some active factor. For, if it proceeded from one agent and were received in another [distinct subject], then that which would be the principle of activity would not be the form of that thing in which the action is received because the agent and the patient would not be the same supposite nor would such an operation be able to be attributed to the patient as to an operating [agent], but as to a mere recipient. Since, therefore, the soul is said by Aristotle to be the principle "by which we live", it is understood concerning an intrinsic principle by which the living supposite (to which the action is attributed as to an agent) itself operates. And such a principle must necessarily be a true form because, just as form is the principle of being, so it is also the principle of acting.

Hence those who think this definition applies to the intelligence moving the heaven²⁸⁴ err. For that [intelligence] moving the heaven is not the principle by which the heaven moves itself, but it is

²⁸² The second definition is that soul is the first principle of the vital actions of a living being. That this definition is adequate means that it will allow us to distinguish all souls from all forms that are not souls. That it is not quidditative means that it is based on certain necessary accidents of the soul, not on its intrinsic nature.

²⁸³ For Suarez a "supposite" is a complete individual nature possessing a mode of subsistence of its own which completes it and renders it incommunicable to any other supposite.

²⁸⁴ "Heaven" here is equivalent to (but not quite the same as) what we would call "outer space".

an extrinsic principle moving the heaven and that motion cannot be attributed to the heaven as to an agent.

Hence the genus of this definition, namely "the principle by which", is equivalent to the genus of the other definition, namely "an informing act". It is equivalent, I say, by implication, because each genus implies the other. The definition adds "first principle" because there are certain proximate principles of vital activities, as, for example, powers, etc., which are not souls, but the soul is that first principle by which a living thing demands all its powers and through them the soul operates as a first principle. And because to be a first principle of operation belongs also to the form of inanimate things, Aristotle adds the denomination "we live", for the soul is not just any form, but it is that which is the first principle of vital operation. It is established therefore that the soul is defined in this way by the relation it has to activity.

11 But in the second place note that Aristotle in this definition not only offers a definition of soul in general, he also implicitly adds the division of the soul into rational, sensitive, and vegetative, and he gives definitions of all [three types of soul]. Therefore the clause "by which we live" can be taken as signifying the operations of the vegetative soul, that is the principle that gives vegetative life to us. Thus in fact Aristotle says in his book *On Death and Life*, Chapter 1²⁸⁵ that life consists in the action of the hot and the moist, and in Book 6, Chapter 10 of *Topics*,²⁸⁶ interpreting Dionysius the philosopher, he says that "life is that action which naturally places itself in the service of the nutritive function". That this is the meaning of Aristotle in this passage is clear first because he distinguishes the vital principle from the sensitive principle and the intellective principle---therefore he understands "vital" as "vegetative"---then because his intent was to enumer-

²⁸⁵ 469 b 6-20; 470 a 19-b 5.

²⁸⁶ 148 a 26 ff.

ate specifically all the grades of living things, as he plainly says in text 18.²⁸⁷

Thus from all these elements there results one definition of the soul in general, not because all the elements must belong to every soul, but because they are applicable disjunctively in the way in which in a definition of nature we use the phrase "motion and rest."²⁸⁸

But you will object: That definition also applies to a body for, since it is a principle of being, it will also be a principle of action. I respond that [the body] is not the first principle by which we live because it is not that by which we actively elicit vital activities. Hence it is not the first principle, but rather it functions as an instrument of the soul.

12 The second part of the conclusion²⁸⁹ may not be accepted by everyone for, since form has two functions, namely to give being to the composite and to be the first principle of activity, the second function seems to be as essential as the first, and even more so because form is primarily and principally ordered towards activity. And, if it informs a body, it is for the sake of activity, namely that the soul uses the body as an instrument of its activities. [Thus, according to some] the definition that explains the soul's ordination towards activity is more essential than one that explains its relationship with the subject.

Confirmation. This definition is not descriptive because it doesn't express a property of the soul but a certain intrinsic relationship that it has. Therefore, [this definition is quidditative]. This is the

²⁸⁷ *De an.* 414 b 32 f. Cf. *ibid.* 414 b 26; 415 a 12 f.

²⁸⁸ In other words, the nature of a thing can be defined as the first principle of motion and rest in it.

²⁸⁹ This is that the definition of the soul as the first principle of vital activities is not a quidditative definition of the soul.

opinion of Philoponus,²⁹⁰ Simplicius,²⁹¹ and Themistius.²⁹² But our conclusion seems truer, and in it we are following St. Thomas.²⁹³

13 In support of the proof it should be noted that, just as activity follows from being and the two are distinct, so also to be the principle of being and of activity are distinct at least formally. This can be seen in the case of heat. Heat is the form that grants being to what is hot, and it is the principle of heating. These two [aspects] are formally distinct and by reason of these different aspects they are constituted in diverse species of quality. In this way the substantial form is similar to heat and the soul is a substantial form. It truly informs, and it is the principle of activity, and these two [functions] are distinct in it.

This can also be demonstrated with another example: It is an established fact that the soul exercises its act insofar as it is a principle of being and not insofar as it is a principle of activity, as is obvious in a living thing which is not actually acting. It is a fact, therefore, that these two aspects are formally distinct.

14 From what has been said it follows, furthermore, that both aspects cannot pertain to the quiddity of the soul, but one of them constitutes the essence of the soul while the other is, as it were, a property which follows from the essence of the soul.

From this I make a further inference: both definitions cannot be quidditative for, when two definitions make use of two formal principles of which only one can be essential, therefore, also, only one

²⁹⁰ *De an.* II, com. 1: op. cit., folio [33] f.

²⁹¹ *De an.* II 6, op. cit., folio xl.

²⁹² *De an.* II 2-8, op. cit., pp. 248-252.

²⁹³ *De an.* II, lect. 1, n. 229; lect 3, n. 253; lect. 4, n. 271.

definition can be quidditative,²⁹⁴ namely the one which makes use of the essential principle.

Add to this that, if both set forth the quiddity of a thing, either neither would explain it sufficiently or they would be one and the same definition differing only in words. But if the definitions are different and they set forth different formal aspects, only one of them will be quidditative, as has been shown. We have proven that the first definition of the soul is quidditative; it remains, therefore, to conclude that the second definition is not.

This same point becomes obvious in another way: Being is that which primarily constitutes a thing and activity itself is rooted in being. Therefore in form, which is the principle of being and activity, there is first ordination to giving being and then to activity.

Confirmation. Form is not ordered to be nor to act, but that it be that by which another thing is and by which it acts. Therefore form is ordered to these two aspects in the way in which being itself and activity are ordered to each other. Therefore as being is prior to activity, so [also a definition in terms of the being of a thing is prior to a definition in terms of the activities of a thing].

For other proofs of this conclusion see [our commentary on] Book 2 of the *Physics*, question 1, conclusion 1, article 4 where we

²⁹⁴ The text here literally says "essential", but this seems to be an error, since Suarez has, up to this point, been referring to *definitions* which capture the *essence* of a thing as being "quidditative" not "essential", and he here begins to argue that there cannot be two quidditative definitions of a thing, since there cannot be two essences of a thing. Thus, we think that "quidditative" better captures the intended meaning of this passage than a literal translation of it would.

have shown, regarding nature²⁹⁵ in general, that it cannot be defined essentially through an ordination to activity.

15 *The argument against this has no validity.* Form, in fact, is not ordered to body principally so that it might use the body as an instrument of its own activities but so that it might constitute the living entity itself in its complete essence. This appears with greater clarity in material souls²⁹⁶ which are primarily ordered to be the acts of matter by which they are sustained in being [as in a subject] so that they might be principles of action. This includes the rational soul, although it can exercise its proper activities outside the body. It is nevertheless ordered to the body to constitute the human being in its essence. From this fact we get an excellent argument for the conclusion because in the essence of man as such, or in that of any other living being, an ordination to activity is not included essentially. Therefore [it is not included either] in the essence of the soul. A living thing is constituted by the soul in that the soul is essential to the living thing.

With reference to the maxim "Being exists for the sake of activity" from which it seems to follow that nature intends activity before being---I respond that, if we take activity separately from being and being separately from activity, being itself is more fundamental than activity and is that which is intended above all by nature. Nevertheless, because activity presupposes being and includes it, it is rightly said that "Being exists for the sake of activity."

²⁹⁵ By "nature" Suarez here means the nature *of* some thing, e.g. the nature of gold, or water, or a cat, etc, not the sum total of things in the natural universe nor the general laws governing their behavior.

²⁹⁶ By "material souls" Suarez primarily means to refer to any souls which cannot naturally exist without informing matter, i.e. the souls of plants and non-rational animals.

We said something similar above²⁹⁷ regarding first and second act. Also it can be said that the being which is conferred [to a substance] by its powers is primarily and essentially for the sake of activity. On the contrary, the basic being [*esse simpliciter*] which is conferred by a form is not principally ordered to activity but rather the opposite.

By way of confirmation, it can be said that insofar as activity is in some way the end [=goal] of being, the definition could be called causal. (We shall discuss this soon.) It is nevertheless absolutely speaking descriptive since it is constituted by an effect and a determinate property.

16 Fourth conclusion: The first definition, as far as we are concerned, is rightly justified by the second, but not if it is taken by itself or *a priori*. The first part of the conclusion is generally admitted, is certain, and is obvious from what has been said. The second part, which is more difficult, is held by St. Thomas.²⁹⁸ For its proof see what I have already said in [my commentary] on Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics*, Chapters 2 and 3, *dubio*, 4 folios 107 and 108 regarding the phrase in the definition "*Ex primis medioque vacantibus*."

17 *Assuming these things, the conclusion can be proven from Aristotle.*---He says in the beginning of Chapter 2²⁹⁹ that he wants to proceed from what is well known by us to prove what is well known considered by itself. Thus he moves from what is absolutely clear to our senses to prove the definition, as is obvious in text 23³⁰⁰ and from the argument in its totality.

²⁹⁷ In question 2, section 7 of the present disputation.

²⁹⁸ *De an.* II, lect. 3.

²⁹⁹ *De an.* 413 a 11-15.

³⁰⁰ See the immediately preceding note.

Hence I form my argument in the following way: Aristotle does not prove the first definition by the second except insofar as the second is better known. But the second is not clear in itself but with respect to our knowledge.³⁰¹ Therefore the proof proceeds from experience and from what is clear only with respect to our knowledge. The minor is clear since, if we prescind from all experience, it is as obscure to us whether the soul is the principle of activity as it is whether it is the principle of being. Considering the soul in itself, it is clearer that it is the principle of being because being is prior and is the cause of activity. We in fact come to know activities, and then we deduce that there must be a principle underlying them which we call the soul. Thus, with respect to our knowledge, it is clearer that the soul is the principle of operations, and from this we conclude that there is a principle of being. Nevertheless this process is obviously *a posteriori* only with relation to our knowledge.³⁰²

³⁰¹ Suarez's talk here of what is "clear in itself" versus what is "clear to us" (a way of talking that all the Schoolmen inherited from Aristotle himself) can be unpacked as a way of speaking about epistemic versus ontic priority. The soul cannot be sensed by us, so we know it by an inference as the ultimate root of the vital activities of a living thing. In this way, then, the definition of the soul as the "first principle of all the vital activities of a living being" is better known to us and is, furthermore, true so far as it goes. But on further reflection we will come to see that, before the soul is the first principle of the vital activities of living beings, it is the act of a body that is in potency to being a live. Thus the definition of the soul as "the first act of an organic body that is potentially alive" is based upon a grasp of a truth about the soul which is ontologically prior to its being the first principle of all vital operations of a living being. Suarez's reference to this definition as being "clear in itself" was his way of referring to this ontological priority.

³⁰² For Suarez (and the Schoolmen generally) to reason *a posteriori* is to reason from the effects to the cause of the effects. Aristotle held that this sort of reasoning is a first step in the acquisition of scientific knowledge (i.e. of knowledge of the "reasons for" some fact).

Confirmation: Because if this is not a demonstration "*quia*",³⁰³ then it is certainly not a demonstration, since it is wholly [based on] that which is given through an effect; but this [sort of definition] is not a *per se* [i.e. quidditative] definition.³⁰⁴

A second confirmation: If one were to define heat as the principle of heating or the form of the sun as the principle of illumination, and then try to prove something, he would be thought to be proceeding *a posteriori*. Likewise, if someone were to prove that man is a being endowed with intelligence because he is ordained to see God, he would without doubt be proceeding *a posteriori*. Man is not endowed with intelligence because of his capacity [to see God], but rather because he is endowed with intelligence, [he has the capacity to see God].

Second argument. The quiddity of essences cannot be demonstrated *a priori* by that which is outside the essence. But the first definition explains the quiddity whereas the second explains that which falls outside the quiddity.

You will say: It is sufficient if it explains the cause. But on the contrary, as is evident, [the second definition] does not explain the cause by causal properties. In fact the following [proof] is fallacious: "Because the soul is the principle of activity, it is the principle of being." But rather the contrary would be better: "Because the soul is the

³⁰³ Suarez is here speaking of a distinction the Schoolmen made between different sorts of proofs. This distinction was based on whether or not a proof begins with truths that are ontologically prior or with truths that are epistemically prior. Suarez calls the former sorts of proofs "*propter quid* demonstrations" as well as "*a priori* demonstrations" while the latter sorts of proofs he calls "*quia* demonstrations" and "*a posteriori* demonstrations."

³⁰⁴ The meaning here is that a definition of a thing based wholly on its effects cannot constitute a quidditative definition of a thing.

principle of being, it is the principle of activity."³⁰⁵ Therefore the first definition contains the cause of the second one rather than the opposite.

It is said that activity is an end [goal], and therefore under the aspect of final cause the following [proposition] is true: "Because it is a principle of activity, it is a principle of being." But [I say] the contrary since the final cause of a thing is not a secondary end but a primary and intrinsic one. In fact the intrinsic end of the soul to which it is intrinsically directed is to give being and to vivify substantially. From this it follows that it is ordered towards activity. Hence by explaining the point through causal propositions, the following is true: "Because the soul is ordered towards giving such and such being to a composite, it is ordered to be for it a principle for acting in specific ways." Moreover even under the aspect of end the activity itself is ultimately ordered to bring this being [the living organism] to perfection.³⁰⁶ Therefore under no genus of cause does the second definition contain the cause of the first.

Another Confirmation: If we were considering the matter in a living composite itself, for example in man, he does not have a determinate essence because he is ordered towards determinate actions. Rather, because he has a determinate essence, determinate actions arise from it.

Another Confirmation: For the principle is the same concerning potency and activity: Potency is in no way the cause of essence,

³⁰⁵ Suarez thinks that the first argument confuses the epistemic with the ontic while the second does not. Nevertheless he admits that we come to know of the soul's existence by means of its effects.

³⁰⁶ The idea is that the various activities of a human being, thinking, acting virtuously, etc. are themselves ordered to perfecting the human being so that, though in a way a human is for the sake of her activities, ultimately her activities are themselves for the sake of her since it is she, a substance, who is perfected by her activities.

nor does essence exist because of potency. Therefore neither is activity a cause of being.

18 *There are numerous [scholars] who oppose this conclusion, thinking that the proof is a priori.*³⁰⁷--- The Greeks in general follow this, as does Albert the Great³⁰⁸ and many of the Latins such as Cajetan³⁰⁹ on this passage and many contemporary authorities. Aristotle provides some support for them in the beginning of the second chapter³¹⁰ where, he says, he is going to explain the cause of a definition given in the first chapter, as he himself says.³¹¹ For this purpose he adduces an example from mathematics in which one definition is proven by another one *a priori*.

Secondly, it is a proof through final cause: Therefore it is *a priori*.³¹² The antecedent is obvious since the proof is based on activity, and activity is an end for an entity. [Cf.] Book 2, *On the Heavens*, text 17.³¹³ The consequence is proven since the end is the first of the causes from which are derived excellent proofs for both natural and moral questions. We have the testimony of Aristotle in Book 2 of the *Posterior Analytics*³¹⁴ and St. Thomas on the same passage, lecture 16³¹⁵ and on Book 5 of the *Metaphysics*, lecture 1³¹⁶ and in [his commentary on *The Sentences*], book, 2, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1.

³⁰⁷ I.e. the proof by which Aristotle demonstrates that the soul is the first act of an organic body that is potentially alive which takes as its main premise that the soul is the first principle of all vital activities of a living being.

³⁰⁸ *De an.* II 1, 5, *op. cit.*, t. 5, pp. 199 ff.

³⁰⁹ *De an.* II 2, nn. 82-85, *op. cit.*, t. II, pp. 77 ff. Cf. *ibid.* n. 123, pp. 107 ff.

³¹⁰ *De an.* 413 a 15 ff.

³¹¹ *De an.* 412 b 10.

³¹² That is from cause to effect, in this case from a final cause to its effect.

³¹³ 292 a 22.

³¹⁴ 94 b 8-95 a 9.

³¹⁵ *I Post.*, lect. 16 e.

³¹⁶ n. 757.

It is also proven from Book 2, *Posterior Analytics*, Chapter 11³¹⁷ where Aristotle proves a definition through another definition starting with the end, and the process is considered *a priori*.

19 St. Thomas responds here to the first argument³¹⁸ saying that the example given by Aristotle is valid under some aspects but not all. For it is valid, he says, insofar as a definition ought to be persuasive and demonstrative in some way, but not insofar as it is an *a priori* demonstration.

But the answer does not seem to be to be satisfactory since Aristotle states plainly³¹⁹ that the cause of a definition must be given.

Averroes³²⁰ and Giles³²¹ respond that the first definition is called "*quia*" and this one "*propter quid*"³²² because the former is made in general but the latter reaches down to concrete souls and gives means sufficient to demonstrate all their passions. Nevertheless, this reply is not to the point.

Others reply that Aristotle is talking about a cause which is at the same time an effect and a cause. Activity is of this sort and so in general is the end since Aristotle includes both at the beginning of that chapter.³²³

The reason is that activity insofar as it is an effect is better known to us but, in so far as it is an end, it reveals the thing *a priori* since the quiddity of a thing is known most fully from its end; and, as

³¹⁷ 94 b 18-26.

³¹⁸ *De an.* II, lect 3, n. 252.

³¹⁹ *De an.* 413 a 15.

³²⁰ *De an.* II 12, *op. cit.*, folios xxxvii f.; *op. cit.* (ed. Crawford), pp. 149 f.

³²¹ *De an.* II 12, *dub.* 1, *op. cit.*, folio 26, col. 1.

³²² "*Propter quid*" was term used by the Schoolmen to designate demonstrations from causes to effects, and essences to attributes.

³²³ *De an.* 413 a 15 ff.

long as the end is not known, the essence of a thing cannot be considered to be perfectly known. Hence it seems that in this one demonstration Aristotle combines [both] a demonstration from the effect and from the cause.

20 *This opinion, taken with a grain of salt, can be admitted.*--- In the first place, therefore, it should not be denied that the proof considered in itself and as such is *a posteriori* since its middle term³²⁴ is *posterior* to the quiddity of the soul. In addition the ordination to activity is not the final cause of the quiddity of the soul, but is a secondary end derived from the primary end of the soul which is to give being to the composite. Hence Aristotle further on in Chapter 4³²⁵ expressly teaches that the soul of a living entity has the nature of three causes, namely the formal in so far as it confers being, the efficient insofar as it is a principle of activity, and the final in as much as all its powers and activities are ordered towards its perfection. Therefore activity is not the primary end of the soul considered in itself, but rather the reverse. With respect to us nevertheless, but not³²⁶ in the order of existential reality, it can be said that activity is the end of the soul and that it has been made on account of activity. Thus in respect to us the proof is causal, but it is not if considered in itself and absolutely.³²⁷

21 *Note that, for the sake of understanding, not everything that is the final cause of the activity of an agent is also the final cause of the quiddity of a thing considered in itself.*--- It is absolutely true that God has created man with an intellectual nature because He has or-

³²⁴ I.e. "being the first principle by which we live, sense, and understand."

³²⁵ *De an.* 415 b 7-28.

³²⁶ Here the word "*seu*" must be taken to mean "but not", not "or" since throughout this passage Suarez has been contrasting that which is first with respect to our knowledge with that which is first in the order of existence or reality.

³²⁷ I.e. it is causal with respect to our knowledge, since we come to know certain things by inference, whether or not such inferences are *quia* or *propter quid*.

dered him to freely arrive at the Beatific Vision. Nevertheless it does not follow that man considered in himself possesses an intellectual nature because he has been created by God for that end. Rather, because considered in himself he has an intellectual nature, it was proper for him to be created for that end.

Likewise it is true that the Earth was created endowed with enormous weight because it was created so that it would be in the lowest place serving as the base of all other things. Nevertheless, considered in itself the Earth is not heavy for this reason; rather because by its nature it is heavy, it was suitable to be ordered towards this end.

22 Therefore, one should note that it is one thing to consider an entity according to itself and another thing to consider it as it falls under the intention of an agent.---Often the quiddity of a thing considered in itself does not have a final cause or does not have a certain kind of final cause, but it can have one as it falls under the intention of an agent. In that case³²⁸ a proof proceeding from an end is not unconditionally *a priori* if considered in itself. It is nevertheless with respect to us in some way because we consider things as they exist and have been made.³²⁹ I said "often" and not "always" because imperfect things which by their nature are ordered to another thing as to an end--and their essence consists in this, for example, accidents, potencies and such like ---these have a final cause of their quiddity.³³⁰ In their

³²⁸ I.e. in case it has an intentional end.

³²⁹ Suarez probably has in mind here artifacts such as a chair or a watch which, in and of themselves, are not really ordered to an end, but are so only from our point of view since they were made by us to serve certain of our ends and to have objective properties which allow us to use them for these ends.

³³⁰ The idea here seems to be that substantial forms and accidents are really and intrinsically ordered to certain ends by what they in themselves *are*, quite separately from the way *we consider them* to be. In this regard they are different from artifacts which have no intrinsic or ontological relation to the ends that we make them for.

case a proof starting with the end can be taken to be *a priori*. This proves the second argument together with its supporting confirmation since the soul is also classified among imperfect entities and its primary end is to give being to a composite. From this fact an *a priori* proof can be derived. Nevertheless an ordination to activity is not the end of a soul considered in itself but only with respect to us. Hence a proof proceeding from such an ordination gives a cause with respect to us but not absolutely or considered in itself.

23 It is in this sense that Aristotle should be interpreted since his position is absolutely clear; his example also suggests this since it gives the cause [solely] with respect to us.

24 We have dealt with this material in the chapter *On Real Relations* and in Book 1 of [our commentary on] the *Posterior Analytics* in the passage just cited and at the end of that work where we discussed wisdom. See what is said there, and they and these will be understood better.