

## FABIOLA, ST.

Early Christian benefactress and friend of St. JEROME; d. Rome, 399. She came to the wealthy Roman nobility descended from Julius Maximus and had an extremely passionate nature. Fabiola divorced her first husband because of his vices. To protect herself, she took a second husband, separating herself from Church communion until, as Jerome asserted, the death of her second husband and her public penitence at the church of the Lateran on Easter eve in the presence of the bishop and clergy. She sold her possessions, gave to the poor, and supported monasteries in Italy. In 395 she journeyed to Bethlehem with her relative Oceanus, staying there with SS. PAULA and EUSTOCHIUM.

When the controversy over ORIGENISM divided Jerome and his friends from RUFINUS OF AQUILEIA and Melania, efforts were made to draw Fabiola to the cause of Bp. JOHN OF JERUSALEM, who supported Rufinus (Jerome, *Cont. Ruf.* 3.14); but they proved unsuccessful. Fabiola eagerly attached herself to the teachings of Jerome (*Epist.* 77), who wrote two dissertations for her: one, on the mystical meaning of the dress of the high priest (*Epist.* 64); and another, on the 42 stations (*mansiones*) of the Israelites in the desert (*Epist.* 78). At the rumor of an invasion of the Huns she returned to Rome in 396. A letter from the Roman priest Amandus to Jerome in which he asks Jerome's views on a woman taking a husband while another, although dissolute, husband lives indicates that she may have contemplated a third marriage; but she was discouraged from it by Jerome in his answer to Amandus (*Epist.* 55).

The last three years of her life were spent in charitable activity. She joined PAMMACHIUS in the institution of a hospital at Porto, where she herself cared for the poor and sick. As her restless disposition had found Rome and Italy too small for her charities, she was considering a long journey when she died. The whole of Rome attended the funeral of Fabiola, their great benefactress.

Feast: Dec. 27.

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## FABRI, FILIPPO (FABER)

Theologian, commentator on DUNS SCOTUS; b. Spinata di Brisighella, Italy, 1564; d. Padua, Aug. 27,

1630. He joined the Friars Minor Conventual in 1583. After ordination he studied at the friaries of Ferrara, Padua, and Rome. His fame spread and he became professor of philosophy (1603) and theology (1613) at the University of Padua. Although elected provincial of Bologna (1625–30), he continued to lecture on the teachings of Duns Scotus, becoming renowned for his clear explanations of Scotistic doctrine. Among his writings are: *Philosophia naturalis Duns Scoti* (1601), *Disputationes theologicae* (1620), *Theologicae disputationes de predestinatione* (1623). The *Commen. in XII libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis ad mentem Scoti* and *De primatu Petri, et Pontificis Romani* were published posthumously (Venice 1637). Many of his works are in manuscripts in the Paduan Library. He collaborated in the writing of the Urban Constitutions for the Order of Minor Conventuals.

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## FACULTIES OF THE SOUL

The faculties of the soul are often called its potencies. POTENCY, generally speaking, is basically of two sorts, each understood in relation to its corresponding actuality. There is a potency for the actuality that is being, and a potency for the actuality that is making or doing. For example, marble is said to have a potency for being a statue; water in its liquid state has not. Marble has a certain consistency—found also in materials like bronze, wood, and clay—by which it can acquire and maintain the shape of statue. But marble does not make itself into a statue. It is the sculptor who does this. Now, if the sculptor “does” this, he “can do” it; that is, the sculptor has a potency for making the statue. Thus, just as “is” entails “can be,” so too “does” entails “can do.” “Can be” is said to be a passive potency; “can do,” an active potency, and hence, also a power. The potencies of the soul, like the potency of the sculptor, are active potencies, or powers for doing; they are potencies for the performance of life activities. Because of this they are often called powers of the soul.

**How Defined.** The powers of the soul are closely related to the soul's definition. The common definition of

soul states nothing distinctive of the existent types of soul. To define each type, one must become acquainted with the activities attributed to each; for one comes to know what a thing is by observing what it does. And if it “does,” it “can do.” One can thus describe the types of soul in terms of their potencies. For example, the vegetative soul is the soul with potencies for nourishing, growing, and reproducing. Yet this has little meaning unless one knows what the activities of nourishing, etc., are. One can get at the nature of these activities by considering the objects on which they bear; for all activities bear on some object. Thus, one can move from object to activity to faculty to type of soul. This does not mean that there are four separate analyses, one each for object, activity, faculty, and type of soul. There is actually only one analysis, that of the object (and of what is implied by it; e.g., an analysis of the sort of natural organized body that this requires); for the activity is defined in terms of the object, the faculty in terms of the activity, and the type of soul in terms of its faculties. To have analyzed the object is to have analyzed the activity and the faculty, hence to have said something about the type of soul and natural organized body.

**Vegetative Faculty.** The generic object of the vegetative faculty is said to be two different things: (1) food (see Aristotle, *Anim.* 415a 23–416b 30), and (2) the body of which the soul is the first actuality (see St. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST 1a, 78.1). One might wonder about the fact that two different objects are assigned; but the wonder is dispelled if one considers that vegetative activities terminate in this body, but only after having acted upon and affected food. Now, food can be considered in three ways: (1) as nutriment, and so considered it conserves the living body in existence; this is the specific object that defines the activity of nourishing; (2) as augment, and so considered it brings the living body to its quantitative maturity; this is the specific object that defines the activity of growing; and (3) as overflow, and so considered it prepares the living body for producing another like itself; this is the specific object that defines the activity of reproducing.

Although the vegetative faculties use food, they also use the vegetative bodily organs, such as stomach and liver; they also use the natural activities of certain elements and compounds, such as HCl. In spite of such a thorough dependence, there is a degree of transcendence of vegetative activities over the activities of matter in its nonliving states. By its vegetative activities, in which it employs activities that are found also in matter in its nonliving states, a living thing destroys another (food), and by this destruction maintains itself in existence.

**Sensitive and Intellectual Faculties.** The generic object of the sensitive faculty is whatever is sensible. For

sight, it is the visible; for hearing, the audible, etc. The object of the intellectual faculty is whatever is intelligible. This is to say that things in the real world are the objects of sense and intellect; as sensible, they are the objects of senses; as intelligible, the objects of intellect. The sense and the thing as sensible cooperate, as agent and instrument, respectively, in the production within the sense of a form, called the sensible species, by means of which the sense functions, e.g., by means of which sight sees. The intellect and the thing as intelligible (things in the physical world are only potentially intelligible, whereas they are actually sensible) cooperatively produce, as agent and instrument respectively, a form within the intellect, called the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect understands what these things are. This form, unlike the sensible species that is individualized by the bodily matter of the organ of sense, is an absolute form (see SPECIES, INTENTIONAL; SOUL, HUMAN, 4).

Although the activities of the sense faculties depend on certain bodily organs (e.g., eye, ear, and nose) and on certain natural activities of elements and compounds (e.g., the photochemical changes in the retina of the eye), these activities nonetheless transcend the activities of matter in its nonliving states. Unlike what happens in the case of changes in the realm of the nonliving and in that of the vegetative, in the case of the change that occurs in a sense when it is actually sensing, a sensible form is produced by, and is present in, a substance that is not the ordinary physical subject of that sensible form. Thus, when the eye sees a tree, there is present in the substance that is the eye a visual form whose ordinary physical subject is the substance that is a tree.

The transcendence of the intellectual faculty is complete, because the form produced by it, and present in it, is an absolute form.

**Faculty in General.** In addition to questions—What is the faculty of sight, and how does it differ from the faculty of understanding?—raised with a view to making more complete one’s account of what soul is, philosophers ask more general questions about the soul’s faculties—What is a faculty? And how are the faculties related to the soul? Is the soul constituted out of its faculties as a whole out of parts? Are the faculties substances or accidents?

The faculties of the soul are power parts, as opposed to quantitative parts (see SOUL). They are accidents, for the actualities to which they are related, namely, life activities, are accidents, and things related as potency to actuality must be in the same genus. The soul cannot be composed of its faculties as a whole out of parts; for the soul is in the genus of substance, and nothing substantial can be intrinsically constituted of accidents. Although the

soul has a plurality of faculties distinct from itself as accidents from something substantial, these are nonetheless united in the soul itself, for in each one living thing there can be but one soul, since the soul is a substantial form. The soul is the one source of all its diverse activities and faculties. Most properly speaking, the living thing, the total living thing, performs life activities; and this it does primarily by means of the soul and its power parts, and secondarily by means of the natural organized body and its bodily parts. The faculties of a living thing are the many accidents of one living substance.

Because of the undesirable connotations of the term faculty, some prefer to use in its stead words like power, potency, capacity, or ability. For in the last two centuries faculty has come, unfortunately and quite in distortion of the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion, to designate tiny independent entities, substancelike, as sources of diverse life activities. More recent PSYCHOLOGY, rightly rejecting the faculties of the faculty psychologists, has at the same time returned to a recognition of the fundamental idea of active potencies or powers. Psychological testing has revealed that human activities are of essentially diverse sorts, and that each sort derives from some tendency or inclination to act in that sort of way. These inclinations appear to be innate, but open to development and differentiation in the individual by means of his experience with the world. It is clear not only that the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of active potencies is compatible with the concept of innate tendencies or inclinations or capacities, but also that the two concepts are in fact the same, though differently verbalized. Another difference lies in the methodology employed. The Aristotelian-Thomistic concept was arrived at by means at the disposal of the ordinary man, viz, ordinary sense observation and introspection. The contemporary concept, on the other hand, was arrived at by scientific means, through the factor analysis of investigators like C. Spearman (1863–1945), J. McK. Cattell (1860–1944), and L. Thurstone (1887–1955)—an interesting and important scientific confirmation of an age-old philosophical concept.

*See Also:* INTELLECT; WILL; SENSES; APPETITE.

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## FACUNDUS OF HERMIANE

Sixth-century African bishop and theologian. Although nothing is known of the origins or early career of

Facundus, he belonged to a group of African theologians whose knowledge of the history of the Church and whose theological method, based on the Scriptures and doctrines of the Church Fathers, enabled them to give a clear and logical explanation of the truths of the faith, characteristic of the finest patristic tradition. He likewise stood forth as a champion of the liberty of the Church, asserting its independence of the civil power: “Since civil affairs are not subject to the church, how can the affairs of the church be subject to the palace?” (*Pro def. Trium Cap.* 12.4).

Facundus was present in Constantinople when the *acephali*, or semi-Eutychians, as he called the party of THEODORE ASCIDAS, persuaded JUSTINIAN I that by condemning the THREE CHAPTERS he could regain the Monophysites to union with the Catholics; and Facundus maintained that this stratagem was a means of seeking vengeance for the condemnation of ORIGINISM by the Emperor’s Edict of 543, brought about by the Roman deacon, later Pope, PELAGIUS I (*ibid.* 1.2; 4.4). Facundus appears to have been present at a synod under Mennas in 546 that discussed the results of the Edict of 544 against the Three Chapters and to have begun writing his 12 books *In Defense of the Three Chapters*. He was one of the 70 bishops who participated in a synod with Pope VIGILIUS I in Constantinople (autumn 547) to discuss the Three Chapters; and in the third session, by his offer to prove that the Council of Chalcedon had accepted the Letter of Ibas of Edessa, caused the Pope to prorogue discussion and ask for the opinions of the bishops in writing. Not yielding to the pressure of the imperial agents, Facundus obtained a seven-day delay in submitting his vote, contrary to the desire of the Emperor.

On later completing his *Defense*, which was addressed and submitted to Justinian, Facundus had to leave the capital. He took part in the general council of Africa (550) that condemned Pope Vigilius until he should rescind the *Judicatum I*. From hiding in exile, he followed the events leading to the Council of CONSTANTINOPLE II (553) and the Pope’s submission to the Emperor’s pressure (Feb. 23, 554). He directed his *Liber contra Mocianum* against the Pope’s turnabout and the intrigue of the government represented by the civil official Mocianus (553 or 558). In 568 he wrote an *Epistola fidei catholicae* summing up his defense of the Three Chapters and attacking Popes Vigilius and Pelagius and the Council of Constantinople II.

The theological argumentation of Facundus’s *Defense of the Three Chapters* had been taken into consideration by Justinian in preparing his *Rectae fidei confessio* (July 551), and it was used as the basis for Pope Vigilius’s *Constitutum* of May 14, 553, as well as for the *In de-*