

KÜNG, *Structures of the Church*, tr. S. ATTANASIO (New York 1964).

[C. BERTHELOT DU CHESNAY]

## APPELLANTS

A name given to opponents of the bull *UNIGENITUS*, who appealed against the papal decree to a general council; they thus logically applied the Gallican doctrine of the Four Articles of 1682 that affirmed the superiority of a general council over a pope. The first act of appeal was presented under the form of a notarized act lodged at the Sorbonne on the morning of March 5, 1717 by four bishops: Jean Soanen, of Senez; Joachim Colbert, of Montpellier; Pierre de la Broue, of Mirepoix; and Pierre de Langle, of Boulogne. Many members of the secular and regular clergy, an important segment of the faithful, as well as several corporate societies, among them the Sorbonne, adhered to the Appeal, which finally united 12 bishops and a little more than 3,000 priests and religious of the approximately 100,000 that made up the French clergy.

The Appellants thought that the bull condemned some authentic Christian truths, that consequently the pope had erred in faith, and that only a general council could remedy the situation. On Sept. 8, 1718 (day of publication), by the brief *Pastoralis officii*, Clement XI excommunicated the Appellants. In view of the opposition from the Gallican parliamentaries, this measure produced no practical effect. To guarantee the failure of any attempt at a compromise, the four bishops renewed their appeal on Sept. 10, 1720, and the "Reappellants" who joined them were numerous. The regent then embarked on a veritable campaign of police persecution against the Appellants, and their number decreased year by year; many of them, however, maintained their attitude until death.

See Also: JANSENISM; ACCEPTANTS.

**Bibliography:** The most complete selection of the acts of appeal is that of G. N. NIVELLE, *La Constitution "Unigenitus" déferée à l'église universelle*, 3 v. in 4 (Cologne 1757).

[L. J. COGNET]

## APPETITE

In normal usage the term appetite designates a desire for food and the capacity to enjoy it. Without straining its meaning, however, it can signify almost any desire, for example, an appetite for hard work or for pleasure. The word derives from the Latin *appetitus*, which means a

seeking for something. As used in scholastic philosophy, appetite is defined as the inclination and order of a thing toward the GOOD, and designates the element in the nature of things whereby they have or develop tendencies toward objects that benefit them.

### Thomistic Concept of Appetite

In Thomistic philosophy, appetite in the strict sense specifies the capacity of a thing to seek its good; when used more broadly, it includes the actual seeking as well. Appetite thus is both the fundamental power to seek and the actual exercise of that power. Psychologically, this concept is closely connected with a number of other concepts, for example, orexis, conation, urge, drive, feeling, emotion, affectivity and passion. Orexis is the Aristotelian term for appetite, sometimes signifying appetite in general and at other times the power of the will. Conation, urge and drive are terms that are used almost interchangeably to indicate the forceful or impulsive aspect of appetites. FEELING and affectivity are generally used to indicate the felt quality connected with appetitive activity. Emotion and passion can be used for both the feeling aspect and the drive aspect of appetites. Passion in current usage often signifies a more intense emotion; in scholastic use, it did not have this connotation.

In the philosophy of St. THOMAS AQUINAS and among scholastics generally, appetite is attributed to all beings, from God, who has Will, to primary matter, which has an appetite for substantial form. The classical expression of this idea is: An inclination follows every form (*Summa theologiae* 1a2ae, 8.1), for everything is either on account of itself or on account of another and what is on account of itself seeks itself, while what is on account of another seeks that other. Otherwise the parts of the universe are absurd, as being ordered to purposes but not effectively equipped to attain them (see FINAL CAUSALITY; TELEOLOGY).

### DIVISION OF APPETITE

The first division of appetite is into natural and elicited appetites. Because things exist as they are and tend to continue in existence for a while and because they operate as they ought to operate, they are said to have a natural appetite to exist and to operate. Such a natural appetite is not conceived as a reality in a thing distinct from its NATURE; it is rather the nature itself conceived in terms of tendency to be and to operate.

Elicited appetites are the appetites aroused by cognitive acts and they are considered to be distinct parts of the nature of a cognitive being. The evidence for elicited appetites is firstly our human experience and secondly our observation of other animals. We feel impulses and

affects aroused in ourselves by cognitive acts toward various objects and these impel us to action toward these objects; we see, moreover, that animals seem to act the same way and are furnished with the same kind of organs that serve us. We conclude, then, that cognitive beings are in fact equipped with appetites. Moreover, it would be absurd if the case were otherwise, for a knowing being who was absolutely unable to be moved by what he came to know would be frustrated; his knowledge would be futile. Therefore knowing beings ought to have the capacity to be moved by objects as known and such a capacity would be, by definition, an elicited appetite.

Therefore, since there are appetites aroused by cognitive acts, there will be at least as many distinct kinds of elicited appetite as there are distinct orders of KNOWLEDGE (ST 1a, 80.1). Scholastics, dividing knowledge basically into SENSE knowledge and intellectual knowledge, divide appetite into sensitive appetites and the will, which is the appetite of the intellective part.

### SENSITIVE APPETITES

By definition, a sensitive appetite is a capacity to be aroused by a concrete object perceived through the SENSES. It is, therefore, an operative power, that is, a power to respond and to react. This response or reaction on the part of the possessor of the appetite has a twofold moment. First of all, it is a kind of passivity, by which the possessor is changed or moved by the impact of the object sensed. Secondly, since this change is of the nature of a tension produced in the possessor, an inclination to action follows, for the purpose of relieving the tension. Hence appetites tend to provoke action. The actions are designed to obtain or avoid the object that originally aroused the appetite: to obtain it if it is good, or to avoid it if it is evil. Since avoiding evil is itself good, one can define the appetite as ordered simply to the good, either directly or indirectly.

**Organic changes.** Hence the sense appetites arise from the sense knowledge that elicits them, involve a physical change in the organism, and result in action. The physical change may be greater or less, but it is always present. Medieval scholastics spoke of such changes as the rising of the blood around the heart in anger, the withdrawal of the blood toward the bowels in fear and so on. Modern physiology recognizes changes in the circulatory, respiratory, glandular and other systems, as component parts of emotional changes. The basic organs of appetitive movement seem to be the hypothalamus in the brain and perhaps parts of the rhinencephalon, for experiments stimulating these organs of the brain with electric currents result in reaction patterns of the emotive or motivational order [see J. Olds, "Pleasure Centers in the Brain," *Scientific American* 195 (October 1956)

105–116]. The autonomic nervous system that stimulates visceral, glandular and other somatic changes in emotional reactions is the connecting link between the brain centers of sensitive appetite and the other corporeal reactions involved.

**Concupiscible vs. irascible appetites.** Thomistic psychology posits two sensitive appetites, the concupiscible and the irascible. The arguments for this division run thus: Some passions in the organism are aroused on the basis of simple PLEASURE and pain, as it seeks out what is pleasing physically and avoids what feels injurious. These reactions constitute the operations of one appetite, the concupiscible, whose ultimate object is defined as the simple, sensitive good. But other emotional reactions are based not simply on pleasure and pain. Thus we experience inclinations impelling us toward things that are hard or difficult to attain, or we find emotional responses impelling us to reject or despair of good objects. These appetitive activities are assigned to a second sensitive appetite, called the irascible appetite, whose object is the difficult or arduous sense good.

Of the two, the basic appetite is the concupiscible. The irascible appetite is an emergency appetite, aroused when simple movements toward a sensible good or away from a sensible evil are impeded by some obstacle. The irascible appetite is aroused precisely to overcome the obstacle. When it is overcome, the irascible appetite subsides and the simple concupiscible appetite functions alone. For example, love is a simple concupiscible movement toward a good or pleasant object and when the object is here and now attainable, the love for it generates an actual desire. If the object can be obtained, the desire comes to fruition in joy or delight. This all occurs in the concupiscible appetite. But if, when desire is aroused, a sudden obstacle impedes the attainment of the good, then anger, an irascible passion, will perhaps be stirred up against the impediment. Anger urges toward overcoming or destroying it; once this is done, nothing prevents obtaining the object and so there is a return to delight or joy. Or again, one might be faced with an object he dislikes, feel an aversion toward it and hence avoid it—all movements of the concupiscible appetite. If he can avoid it, he feels contentment or joy. But if some circumstance suddenly appears making it seem impossible to avoid the disliked object, his aversion takes on an emergency quality; it turns into fear, another irascible passion and under the stimulus of fear he reacts more energetically to escape the evil. If he does escape it, he again feels joy.

**Acts of the sense appetites.** The various actions of the sense appetites, which are called the PASSIONS or EMOTIONS, are divided in Thomistic psychology into 11 general categories, six in the concupiscible appetite and

five in the irascible appetite. LOVE, the first passion of the concupiscible appetite, is the fundamental passion underlying all others. Love is defined, in an abstract way, as the simple tendency toward a good thing. DESIRE, which arises from love, is a tendency toward a good thing that is not yet possessed but is presently possessible. JOY follows from desire when the good thing is actually possessed. Hate, the opposite of love, is the turning away from an evil thing. Aversion arises from hate, as an actual repugnance to an evil thing presenting itself. Sorrow follows after aversion, if the evil thing actually afflicts us. HOPE is the name given to the first of the irascible appetites. It is the vehement seeking of a good object that is hard to obtain. COURAGE is the energetic attack on an evil that is hard to overcome. Despair is the giving up of a good object because of difficulties, and FEAR is the urgent avoidance of an evil that is hard to escape. Anger, finally, is the movement toward an evil that is hard to overcome for the sake of destroying it. All movements of passion, with their various modalities and mixtures and shades of difference, can be comprised without great difficulty under these 11 basic categories.

#### HUMAN WILL

The WILL is the rational or intellectual appetite in man, that is, the appetite that seeks goods as they are perceived by the power of INTELLECT. As the intellect is the supreme cognitive power in man, so the will is the supreme appetite in man, controlling all human behavior; and as the intellect is a spiritual power, so is the will. Thus all purely spiritual or rational goods are sought by the will alone and rational and spiritual evils are rejected by the will. It is the will that desires justice, truth, order, immortality, the service of God and the like, and hates injustice, deceit, chaos, and death. However, the will's objects are not limited to spiritual things—it seeks also to obtain or avoid physical goods sought by the sensitive appetites; but when the will acts in this sphere, it is because it sees reasonableness in these physical goods. Thus, the sight of food might arouse a person's concupiscible appetite because food is pleasant to eat but he wills to eat it only if he sees that it is reasonable here and now to do so. Hence a man can also starve himself in spite of a contrary urging from the sensitive appetites, if in the circumstances he judges this is a reasonable thing to do. The will ultimately controls all behavior, as long as man is conscious and sane; even behavior motivated primarily by the sense appetites is not carried out unless the will consents.

**Free Will.** The will is a free power in man, because it is the appetite that follows reason (*see* FREE WILL). Because reason can see several alternatives equally feasible as means of reaching one end, the will has freedom to elect from among them.

**Acts of the Will.** The acts of the will are often called by the same names as the passions of the sense appetites, namely, love, hate, desire, fear, anger and so on. These, however, are not the names of the will's proper acts. The principal proper acts of the will are to intend an end or purpose, to elect the means to accomplish it, to command the actions that execute it, and to rest content in the purpose accomplished (*see* HUMAN ACT). If the purpose is to attain a good, we call the acts of intention, election and command, acts of love; if they are aimed at destroying evil, we call them anger; if at escaping an evil, we call them fear and so on.

**Relationship to sense appetites.** The relationships between the will and the sense appetites are complex. One can arouse the sensitive appetites deliberately by willing to think about and imagine the objects that stir them. Moreover, it often happens that a particularly strong act of the will produces a similar passion in the sense appetites, by a kind of overflow or redundancy. So, for instance, some people feel fright physically when called on suddenly to address a large audience, although there is nothing physically threatening. In their turn, the sense appetites can exert considerable influence on the will. The freedom of the will, for instance, depends on the power of reason to judge a situation calmly, taking into account all possibilities. But when the passions are strongly aroused, the power of reason often fails to judge carefully and a man is precipitated into actions he would not otherwise have performed. The passions fix the attention of the mind on the things that stir them and limit its capacity to reflect and thus indirectly limit the freedom of the will. Moreover, to act contrary to strong passions produces strong feelings of pain and sorrow and rather than endure these, men often consent to things they would otherwise reject. Thus, although the will is free and in supreme command in theory, in practice it is often limited by the sense appetites.

#### Other Theories of Appetition

Many philosophers and psychologists have disagreed with one element or another of the theory of appetition outlined above. Some have denied that appetition is a force consequent and subordinate to cognition. Others have questioned its precise relationship to action. Still others deny the distinction between sense appetites and will, or introduce a dichotomy between affectivity and conation or drive. A summary of representative views along these lines follows.

#### SCOTUS, SCHOPENHAUER AND FREUD

John DUNS SCOTUS in the 14th century placed appetite above cognition in the ordering of faculties, arguing that the will is the supreme power in man, against the

Thomistic position that intellect is the highest power, eliciting, governing and regulating the acts of the will (*see* VOLUNTARISM; INTELLECTUALISM).

Arthur SCHOPENHAUER (1788–1860) made will not only the supreme power in man's psychological equipment, but the fundamental reality in all of nature. He argued that the will leads the intellect to its judgments; governs memory, imagination, logic and reflection; drives men in all their actions; and in short, constitutes the essence of man. Moreover, will governs all movements in nature, in animals, in plants and in inanimate bodies—will is the ultimate reality. "The world is wide in space and old in time and of an inexhaustible multiplicity of forms. Yet all this is only the manifestation of the will to live" [*The World as Will and Idea*, tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London 1906) 3:379].

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) made drive the major element in human nature and denied that it was elicited by cognition. For him, drives are basically the psychological manifestations of biological processes, arise spontaneously and inexorably in the mind and only subsequently attach themselves to cognitive elements or objects that represent actions and things peculiarly fitted to provide satisfaction ["Instincts and their Vicissitudes," *Collected Papers* (London 1956) 4:60–67].

#### LEIBNIZ, JAMES AND DEWEY

Other theories of appetite differ regarding its relation to action. G. W. LEIBNIZ (1644–1716) gave his monads two basic activities, perception and appetite, but appetite did not give rise to action, it merely effected the transition from one perception to another within the MONAD. Since Leibniz did not hold that the mind could efficiently move the physical world, he could not make appetite the cause of action. In higher organisms, appetite is called will, which is an effort or tendency toward good and away from evil. Will results from consciousness of good and evil and is guided by reason, which propose images of the greater goods and evils that will follow from different courses of action [*New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, tr. A. G. Langley (La Salle, Ill. 1916) 177, 195].

The so-called James-Lange theory of emotions, proposed by William JAMES in 1884 and Carl Lange in 1885, also realigns emotion and action. According to this theory, objects arouse instinctive reactions that in turn produce bodily changes, which are then perceived as emotions. The instinctive reaction results directly from the perception of the exciting fact, whereas the emotion is the felt result of the bodily alteration. "Common-sense says, we lose our fortune and weep . . . the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry" [James

*Principles of Psychology* (New York 1913) 2:449–450]. Experimental evidence does not give unqualified support to this theory, but the element of truth it expresses may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that man becomes conscious of his emotions as a consequence of feeling the bodily commotions they cause [M. Stock, "Sense Consciousness according to St. Thomas," *The Thomist*, 21 (1958) 460–466].

John Dewey (1859–1952) proposed a theory of emotions that made them the effects of impeded action rather than a spur to effective action. He held that emotions are felt as physical disturbances that arise when a strong urge to act is impeded; as long as actions are carried out uninhibitedly, emotions do not occur.

#### MATERIALIST VIEWS

Philosophers of materialist schools deny the scholastic distinction between sense appetites and will. Herbert SPENCER (1820–1903) thought of the will and all the higher powers in man as products of materialistic evolution, whereby simpler psychic responses such as reflexes and tropisms are gradually developed into the more complex operative patterns we name intelligence and will [*Principles of Psychology* (New York 1883) 1:495].

Freud also denied the will as a distinct and higher faculty in man and attributed all drive in human nature to instinctual urges. He did, however, believe that men could control their drives reasonably, and contemporary psychoanalysis often accepts will as a power in man distinct from instinctual drives [for example H. Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation*, tr. D. Rapaport (New York 1958) 74–75].

#### HAMILTON, LOTZE AND CANNON

Modern psychological theory, both philosophical and empirical, usually makes a dichotomy between affectivity, or the felt quality of emotion and conation or drive. This distinction is at least as old as William HAMILTON (1788–1856) who posits cognition, feeling and conation as the three elemental phenomena of consciousness.

R. H. LOTZE (1817–1881) makes the division of ideation, feeling and volition. Feelings arise from pleasure and pain, which are caused by circumstances that are either harmonious to or disturbing to the body. Impulses arise from these feelings, but as distinct from them. Volition also is distinct from impulse [*Microcosmus*, tr. E. Jones and E. Hamilton (Edinburgh 1888) 1.2.2.3]. Although there is a basis in felt experience and in the functional role for a distinction between affect and drive, the intimate connection between these two aspects of appetitive activity is lost by positing two distinct powers or capacities. An affect, for example, guilt feeling, can

motivate a conation, for example, the urge to confess. An action motivated by a drive, for example, eating when hungry, terminates in an affect, namely, contentment. The interplay of drive and feeling is obscured and rendered difficult to explain if the two aspects of appetite are not seen in their organic relationship.

The physiological researches of W. B. Cannon (1871–1945) have contributed useful information to theories of appetite. Cannon investigated the physiological changes produced in the body by situations that demand vigorous action. He traced the patterns of discharge in the involuntary nervous system, the glandular reactions and the alterations in respiration, circulation and muscular tension, etc., and noted how they were all ordained to the exigencies of a body about to be engaged in violent action. These patterns of response did not correlate with specific emotional categories, but were generalized reactions to an emergency. In a scholastic theory of appetite, they would suggest the physiological changes involved in the arousing of the irascible appetite [see *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage* (New York 1929)].

See Also: PASSION; WILL

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[E. M. STOCK]

## APPREHENSION, SIMPLE

The operation by which the INTELLECT apprehends a QUIDDITY without affirming or denying anything of it. In this operation the intellect simply grasps what a thing is, that is, its ESSENCE, without attributing any predicate to it. THOMAS AQUINAS described this activity as an *indivisibilium intelligentia*, understanding of indivisibles or of essences (*In 1 perih.* 3.3).

**Explanation.** Three things should be noted in the definition of simple apprehension. (1) It is an operation, that is, the second act or activity of an operative power. As in most creatural activities, four really distinct factors must be recognized: the operative power itself, its operation, its internal product, and the external SIGN of that product. The operative power or faculty involved in simple apprehension is the possible intellect; the first activity the possible intellect performs is that of simply apprehending a quiddity; its internal product is a formal CON-

CEPT or mental word; the external sign of that concept is an oral or written TERM. (2) It apprehends a quiddity, an essence. Simple apprehension knows merely what man, or white, or learned is. Such “whatnesses” or quiddities are called indivisibles in the sense that a definite group of notes is required for their comprehension—if any of these is missing, the quiddity is not attained. For example, the quiddity of man requires the inclusion of the notes of substance, body, living, sentient, and rational; none can be eliminated and still leave as remainder the quiddity of man. Furthermore, simple apprehension is not limited to merely substantial and accidental essences, formal acts; even when it knows something that is not itself a quiddity, it knows this as if it were one (*per modum quidditatis*). (3) It does so without affirming or denying. This feature distinguishes simple apprehension from JUDGMENT. This first act rests in the knowledge of what man, or white, or learned is; it does not go on, as judgment does, to assert the existential identity or non-identity of two notions, such as “man *is* white” or “this man *is not* learned.”

The act of simple apprehension is not simple, for it involves three prerequisite steps and then the act itself. The first step is the operation of the external SENSES, since nothing comes to be in the intellect that was not first in some way in the senses. The external senses supply various unrelated bits of information about the external thing and thus supply the material for intellection and its bridge of contact with extramental reality. The second step involves the activities of the internal senses. The CENTRAL SENSE combines the data received from the external senses into a common sensible image or percept. The other internal senses either estimate the thing thus perceived or reproduce the thing’s image in its absence. The common sensible image of the internal senses is, in general, called a PHANTASM. Then begins the third step in the process, the functioning of the active intellect; this gives a dematerializing illumination to the phantasm, rather like an X-ray. Using the phantasm as its instrument, the active intellect produces a determinate immaterial impression on the possible intellect, called the impressed intelligible species (*see* SPECIES, INTENTIONAL). At this stage comes the act of simple apprehension itself. Thus determined and specified by the reception of the impressed species, the possible intellect actually knows by producing an expressed species or mental WORD in which it attains its abstracted object (*see* ABSTRACTION).

When the possible intellect moves on to its second type of operation, forming judgments, simple apprehension is required to present the concepts of the possible subject and predicate. Likewise, simple apprehension is required in REASONING, which basically is only a special coordination of judgments.